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Abstract  
 
This dissertation focuses on the quantification of domestic and international spillovers from 
policies adopted in countries with systemically important financial sectors (also referred to as 
systemically important countries) 0F1, namely Japan and China, onto their respective economies, 
as well as Southeast Asia and the rest of the world. The thesis consists of five original chapters.  
 
Chapter One offers a detailed explanation of the Global VAR (GVAR) model, which is later 
employed in chapters Two, Three, and Four, as the tool for analysis of spillovers and the 
propagation of shocks.  
 
Chapter Two presents an empirical analysis to quantifying spillovers from the Bank of Japan’s 
Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) on emerging Asia. It uses a GVAR model of 29 
countries, using monthly data from years 2000 until 2016. This research contributes to the 
literature by being the first- to the best of our knowledge- to look at the impact of QQE on 
emerging Asia through unconventional monetary policy’s impact on stock prices, otherwise 
referred to in the literature as the “stock market channel”. The contribution of this research to 
the related literature is by its identification of shocks related to QQE: the model applies sign 
restrictions to identify a shock to equity prices caused by unconventional monetary policy, 
from a shock to equity prices caused by a standard financial boom. By doing so, it captures the 
spillovers of the stock market boom in Japan following QQE, domestically and internationally. 
Finally, this empirical analysis expands the body of literature regarding the impact of 
quantitative easing from Japan, which is limited compared to the literature concerning the US’ 
quantitative easing. The exercise shows that despite an appreciation of their currencies vis-à-
vis the Japanese yen, the impact on emerging Asia’s GDP tended to be positive and significant 
in the short-run. The results suggest that the positive effect of the increase in equity prices, 
more than offset any negative exchange rate spillover due to expenditure switching from 
domestic demand to Japanese goods. They also suggest that spillovers from QQE might have 
worked mainly through the impact of the stock market channel, rather than through the 
traditional interest rate channel. 
 
Chapter Three uses a GVAR model for 34 countries spanning from 1979Q1 to 2015Q4, to 
proxy the impact of China’s rebalancing from an investment-driven to a consumption-driven 
economy, on a global, regional, and country level. Its contribution to the literature is by 
creating a proxy to the rebalancing, by using country-specific investment and consumption 
data to simulate the effect of the decline of China’s investment, and then the increase of its 
                                                 
1 Systematically important countries (also referred to as systemic countries in this thesis) are defined as 
countries with systematically important financial sectors. As of 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
identifies 29 countries as having systematically important financial sectors, based on the size and 
interconnectedness of each country’s financial sector (Viñals et al., 2010). This group of countries covers 
approximately 90 percent of the global financial system. Included in the list of countries that are deemed 
systemically important are China, Japan, member countries of the euro area, and the United States.    
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consumption, on the rest of the world. By doing so, the research differentiates itself from the 
existing literature, which mainly quantifies the rebalancing through a negative shock to China’s 
GDP. In that context, this research explores the impact of the rebalancing on a country through 
the changes in both GDP components. Through this exercise, we mainly observe that 
commodity prices are negatively impacted not only from a negative China investment shock, 
but also following a positive China consumption shock. The results also suggest that, except 
for commodity exporters, the losses following a negative shock to China’s investment are 
somewhat offset by a positive shock to China’s consumption. The results also show the Asia 
Pacific region specifically benefits from the rebalancing, due to the relocation of capital flows 
to industrialized countries, and the overall increase in demand for consumption goods.  
 
Chapter Four extends the models of chapters Two and Three to compare the propagation of 
shocks from China and other systemic economies to the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). The academic contribution of this chapter consists of building a large GVAR model 
for 47 economies, including 13 countries in the MENA (and 18 oil exporting countries in total), 
and extends the coverage of the data until 2014Q4. The chapter then looks at the impact of 
systemic shocks on the MENA and includes a simplified model which accounts to the demand 
and supply of oil in the region. It also investigates, using time-varying weights, how the 
propagation of shocks from systemic countries may have evolved over time. This chapter adds 
to the limited body of research which analyses spillover shocks to the MENA region, and is 
the first to offer such an extended and updated dataset, to the best of our knowledge. In addition, 
this research is the first to use country-specific consumption and investment data to investigate 
the impact of China’s rebalancing on the MENA region. Studies of shocks relating to the 
MENA region are scarce, mainly because of data availability. Through this study, we hope to 
offer a dataset which can be used for future research, to study the many aspects of the 
propagation of shocks in this region. The results suggest that while China’s linkages have 
deepened with the MENA region, negative output shocks from the United States have a larger 
impact, due to the US’ systemic role in the oil market. The findings also suggest the adverse 
effects of the decline in China’s investment demand are less pronounced on oil importers in 
the MENA, due to the decline in oil prices and an increase in China’s consumption demand.   
 
Chapter Five uses prefectural data to explore the potential impact on wage dynamics of the 
minimum wage increase policy in Japan, which was implemented in 2016 as an indirect means 
to combat deflation. This study offers a comparative analysis on how a one percent increase in 
the minimum wage can affect the average wages of full-time working men and women, 
respectively. This research is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to use a panel dataset on 
a prefectural level, for both genders, to analyze the impact of an increase in the minimum wage 
on the wage distribution of both men and women in Japan. By doing so, we highlight the 
distinct aspects for each gender of the pass-through from the minimum wage to the average 
wage, as well as different trends in the labor market of each group. The main result is that 
stepping up minimum wage growth from 2 to the planned 3 percent per year could raise wage 
growth by 0.5 percent annually. Other results suggest that the pass-through of the minimum 
vii 
 
wage to average wages is larger for men than for women, due to other tax and wage policies. 
The underlying conclusion is that given Japan’s need for income policies to generate vigorous 
wage-price dynamics, reflecting the 2 percent inflation target, one policy implication of this 
finding is that, while the minimum wage plan will help boost wages, it should  be accompanied 
by other, more “unorthodox” income policies, such as a “soft target” for private sector wage 
growth through a “comply -or-explain mechanism” for wage growth and increases in public 
wages in line with the inflation target.  
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Introduction 
This thesis focuses on the spillover effects of macroeconomic policies and shocks from 
economies with systemically important financial sectors (or systemic economies in short), 
namely Japan and China, to the rest of the world. The motivations for carrying out such a 
research project are two-fold: first, the analytical exercises aim to show the diverse ways by 
which emerging and developing economies can be affected when a systemic economy adopts 
a new monetary or macroeconomic framework, while highlighting the different linkages 
through which shocks can propagate. The second motivation comes from the observation that 
the study of the effects of systemic shocks and spillovers generally focuses only on a certain 
number of countries, due to several reasons, but namely data availability. Therefore, this 
dissertation makes efforts to extend the coverage of empirical analysis to more regions and 
emerging countries which may not be generally looked at in the study of the propagation of 
shocks but are nonetheless highly affected by the fluctuations in the business cycles of systemic 
economies.   
There is a vast body of literature which examines the synchronization of business cycles 
linkages among major economies, and the co-movements of macro-economic variables across 
them. The channels through which business cycles are transmitted are many, and are often 
unobserved: from financial linkages, through stock prices and capital flows, to global factors, 
like commodity prices and technology breakthroughs. Examining the propagation of shocks 
gained increased attention following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), when much was 
uncovered regarding how shocks- and policies – can propagate between countries. More 
specifically, the impact from the policies adopted by the fiscal and monetary authorities in the 
9 
 
United States in the aftermath of 2008, highlighted the magnitude of the spillover effects 
domestically and internationally.  
At the forefront of this research is the Global Vector Auto-Regressive (GVAR) model, 
innovated by Pesaran, Smith and Weiner, and further developed by Dees, DiMauro, Pesaran 
and Smith1F2. The Global VAR model was derived as an approximation to a global unobserved 
factor model, where countries can be linked together through country-specific vector-error 
correcting models (VECM). The practicality of the model comes from the inclusion of 
domestic and foreign variables in each country VECM. These financial and global variables, 
often interrelated, relate the co-movements among the integrated regions’ business cycles. For 
example, the inclusion of variables such as stock prices, exchange rates, and interest rates, 
could capture the financial linkages among countries, whereas variables such as oil prices and 
prices of other commodities, could relate the impact of global macro shocks on the world 
economy. In addition, the use of the Global VAR model solved the issue of unobserved factors 
in factor models, which were made popular by the contributions of Stock and Watson 2F3. These 
factor models, which rely on principal components, are widely used for forecasting exercises, 
but can be problematic when it comes to the identification of shocks, given that factor 
components are typically difficult to interpret.  
Although the Global VAR is a flexible model that can be used to analyze various issues in 
spillovers and transmission of shocks, the existing contributions to the literature tend to focus 
on the impact of financial and monetary shocks from the United States and the Euro Area. In 
                                                 
2 Pesaran, Smith and Weiner (2004), and Dees, DiMauro, Pesaran and Smith (2006) 
3 Stock and Watson (2002a) 
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addition, the existing literature predominantly makes use of the dataset offered by the GVAR 
toolbox, thus limiting the studies of spillovers to a pre-determined sample of countries. 
Therefore, the pre-specified data in the toolbox makes it only possible to explore the linkages 
through the offered variables only.   
Keeping the above observations in mind, the rest of this introduction will mainly focus on 
summarizing the contents of five original chapters presented in the thesis, while highlighting 
their contributions to the body of literature. The chapters study the topic of spillovers from 
policies, and while there is a logic to the order in which they are presented, following the 
development of the models and the data, each chapter can be considered as an independent 
analytical exercise, tackling a certain topic. Both in this introduction and the respective 
chapters we will also try to highlight the motivation and the contributions of each analytical 
exercise, as well as the connections with other chapters in thesis, when relevant. 
In chapter One we present the framework to how the Global VAR model is derived. This 
chapters offers no analysis or empirical exercise for the propagation of shocks. Rather, the 
framework of the GVAR is introduced at the beginning of the thesis for practical purposes: 
given that it is the model used in chapters Two, Three and Four, it is laid out in a simplified 
way, for the understanding of the reader. And while various aspects of the model, and different 
datasets, are used in each chapter, the Global VAR remains the tool for analysis.  
In chapter Two we investigate the spillover effects on emerging Asia and on Japan, from the 
Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) program. QQE, which was 
launched by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, (henceforth referred to as “Abenomics”) to combat 
deflation, brought on a considerable improvement in the stock market performance, and a 
weakening of the Japanese Yen. The motivation behind this exercise was to explore whether 
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the linkages of Japan with emerging Asia and ASEAN countries had remained strong enough 
to carry spillover effects, despite the changes in trade and financial patterns throughout the 
years. Given the importance of Japan in the region, it was not non-logical to assume that 
economies in emerging Asia may have been affected by the large quantitative easing program 
of Abenomics. For that purpose, a Global VAR model dataset is built for 29 countries including 
Japan, other systemic countries, and ASEAN economies, spanning from January 2000 until 
September 2016.   
In carrying this exercise, we fill a certain gap in the literature, by being the first to attempt to 
quantify the spillovers from QQE internationally, but specifically through QQE’s impact on 
stock market prices, on different real and financial variables, to the best of our knowledge. 
Kawai (2015) looks at the impact of QQE on emerging Asia through a historical comparison 
of the fluctuation of the exchange rates of said economies after the launch of QQE. Other 
existing papers which analyze the impact of QQE tend to focus on its domestic impact in Japan, 
and mainly on inflation (for example, Fujiwara (2014)). More importantly, the main 
contribution of this research is in its identification of monetary shocks in an Unconventional 
Monetary Policy (UMP) setting. Specifically, we apply sign restrictions to an equity price 
shock to discern it from a standard financial shock, so that we can identify the impact of QQE 
through the stock market channel. The stock market channel infers to the channel of 
transmission of monetary policy to financial markets, investors’ expectations and their 
perception of the riskiness of markets 3F4. We argue that this channel is important for quantifying 
spillovers in an unconventional monetary policy context. This is because the prospects of 
                                                 
4 Bernanke (2003), opening remarks at the Banking and Finance Lecture, Widener University, Chester 
Pennsylvania.   
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identifying monetary policy shocks from a central bank where the interest rates had been at the 
zero-lower bound for many years (before breaking the zero bound in 2016) is challenging. In 
fact, at the zero-lower bound, monetary policy cannot operate through its traditional tools, and 
can only be successful by raising future expectations of higher growth, which by themselves 
are difficult to proxy4F5. Therefore, one must look at the impact of monetary policy through other 
transmission channels. As such, shocks from monetary policy on stock prices are identifiable, 
and are important, given how large fluctuations in equity prices spill over to other assets classes. 
Therefore, this research is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to identify QQE by detangling 
a monetary shock from a financial shock through the stock price channel, and thus capturing 
the stock market channel of QQE on a large-scale GVAR model. Using equity prices also adds 
the advantage of matching stylized facts (equity prices increased significantly during both first 
and second QQE periods in Japan). We also test the propagation of shocks using the shadow 
short-term interest rate as an unconventional monetary policy tool, and argue that it may be 
better suited for capturing domestic spillovers, but that it does not capture the impact of UMP 
on the stock market.  
Our results show that the implementation of QQE in Japan, when estimated by a positive shock 
to Japanese equity prices identified by sign restrictions as a monetary shock, caused temporary 
spillovers, namely, a temporary increase in equity prices across emerging Asian countries, an 
appreciation of the currencies of some, a temporary increase in output for some countries, and 
capital inflows for the first few months. A negative shock to the shadow interest rate only 
captures spillovers domestically, and has a significant impact on the exchange rate, GDP and 
                                                 
5 Krugman (2015) 
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inflation for Japan, but it does not capture the significant increase in equity prices. In line with 
our results, we find evidence in the literature where the shadow interest rate is used, but 
international spillovers are not registered from the United States to other economies 5F 6. In 
chapter Two, we therefore argue that the transmission channel of unconventional monetary 
policy is through not only interest rates, but also through the stock market channel. In that 
context, we argue for the necessity to perform an exercise where the impact of the monetary 
shock on the financial markets is identified, to capture all the spillover effects from monetary 
policy.  
 
Chapter Three of this dissertation studies the possible spillovers from the rebalancing of China 
from an investment-driven economy to a consumption-driven one. This is deemed a relevant 
exercise, given the magnitude of the spillovers which were registered when China embarked 
on its rebalancing transition, from capital outflows, to the weakening of the Renminbi, and 
decreases in commodity prices. Economic research has vastly focused on the effects of this 
rebalancing, on China and other countries. Cashin, Mohaddes, and Raissi (2016) tested 
whether financial volatility in the global market could be affected by China’s rebalancing, 
using a GVAR model. Dzioli et al (2016) also employed a GVAR model to look at the 
spillovers from China to emerging Asia. However, studies of the rebalancing mostly focus on 
GDP-to-GDP spillovers. More specifically, the proxy for China’s rebalancing generally 
comprises of a negative shock to China’s GDP. However, China’s systemic importance in trade 
and in the global value chains asks the question of whether this switch in growth models may 
                                                 
6 Chen et al, (2015).   
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also affect investment and consumption patterns in other parts of the world. In that context, the 
novelty of this research is by its identification of the rebalancing shocks, as opposed to the 
current literature, which studies the rebalancing by focusing on GDP-to-GDP spillovers from 
China to the rest of the world. Specifically, the main contribution of this chapter is its 
simulation of a proxy for the rebalancing of China, by using country-specific investment and 
consumption data instead of real GDP data. Using a proxy which looks at both the effects of 
the decline in investment demand in China and the increase in the consumption demand offers 
a more elaborate way to view how the impact of the rebalancing might be borne on other 
countries. To this extent, our research is the first to the best of our knowledge to investigate 
potential spillovers from the change in GDP components for China and other countries. In 
addition, this chapter exploits the variability of the GVAR model by modeling the impact of 
this rebalancing exercise on a global, regional, and country level. By using a global model for 
34 countries, some of the potential impact of China’s rebalancing on the rest of the world is 
illustrated. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done yet in the literature, mainly to 
the restricted availability of investment and consumption data. Indeed, the large effort of this 
chapter is in the construction of the dataset, which spans from 1979Q1 to 2015Q4. China’s 
switch from an investment driven model to a consumption-driven one is then modeled as a 1 
percent decline in China’s investment, followed by a 1 percent increase in its consumption. 
This exercise also tests the propagation of China investment and consumption shocks through 
trade, commodity prices, and financial linkages. However, given that the actual rebalancing of 
China is an ongoing process, it is important to note that this exercise may not be able to capture 
the full impact of the rebalancing process on the rest of the world.  
15 
 
The results show that the adverse effects of China’s decline in investment demand are 
somewhat offset by the positive spillovers from the increase of its consumption demand for 
some countries. However, the findings mainly suggest that the substantial impact of this 
transition is on commodity prices. Specifically, oil prices drop by 2-3 percent, and metals 
prices by 1-2 percent following a negative 1 percent investment shock, exacerbating adverse 
effects on commodity exporters. On a global scale, an increase in consumption raises global 
investment and global consumption by enough to offset some of the decline incurred by the 
negative investment shock. However, the impact of a one percent positive consumption shock 
remains largely negative on commodity prices, also depressing them by 2-3 percent. Therefore, 
a positive consumption shock does not offset the incurred losses on countries that export 
commodities and investment goods. However, region specific spillovers point that some 
regions benefit from the rebalancing exercise. For instance, the Asia Pacific region, supplier 
of consumption goods, gains from the rebalancing of China and the increase of its consumption 
demand. This implies that other regions may offset losses incurred by the decline in investment 
demand, through the diversification of their exports.  
 
In Chapter Four, we compare the impact of shocks from systemic economies on commodity 
prices, and their subsequent spillover effects on commodity exporters and importers. Namely, 
we focus on the outcome of systemic shocks from China, the United States, and the Euro Zone, 
on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries (GCC). The motivation behind this exercise is the following: despite the systemic 
role of the region in the oil market, few studies have addressed the impact of systemic shocks 
on the MENA region. A notable exception is the paper by Cashin, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012), 
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where they build a GVAR model for spillovers and spillbacks to the MENA region with data 
up to 2008. However, we could not, to the best of our knowledge, find reference in the literature 
to papers which, study the impact of the rebalancing of China, or of a systemic shock from the 
United States after the GFC, on the MENA region. We therefore choose to look at the impact 
of shocks on the GCC, given its systemic role in the supply of oil and natural resources to the 
world market, and given the dependence of other countries in the MENA on the region. By 
using a GVAR model, we can capture direct spillover effects from systemic shocks, and then 
spillovers through secondary channels (for example, commodity prices), and finally, third-
round spillovers on the MENA commodity importing countries (for example, economic 
distress in the GCC caused by systemic shocks can also affect the MENA).   
Our research contributes to the literature by adding to the limited body of research which 
studies the impact of systemic shocks on the MENA region. It also contributes to the GVAR 
literature by extending the coverage of the GVAR model to 47 countries, of which 13 are 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The model includes a total of 
18 oil exporting countries, 11 of which are member countries of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The dataset spans from 1979Q1 to 2014Q4, thus also 
extending the coverage of Cashin, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012)’s model, and offering insight 
on the impact of systemic shocks beyond the GFC.  The GVAR is then modeled in a simplified 
way to account for the demand and supply of oil.  In addition, we compare the evolution of 
linkages between the regions and the three systemic economies in the last two decades. This is 
done as a visualization exercise as to show how trade linkages have changed, subsequently 
causing an evolution in the propagation of shocks. Finally, this chapter applies the rebalancing 
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proxy of China, innovated in Chapter Three, to the MENA region, and is the first research to 
do so, to the best of our knowledge.  
Our results show, when estimating our GVAR for the two fixed trade weight years 1996-1998 
and 2012-2014, that China’s linkages with the MENA have grown, bringing about a larger 
propagation of its shocks. Meanwhile, the same exercise shows that the linkages between the 
USA, the Euro Area, and the MENA have shrunk, allowing for the impact of the shocks to be 
of smaller magnitude. However, the results show that a negative output shock from the United 
States is still larger in magnitude than a China shock or a Euro shock. We attribute this to the 
US’ systemic role in the oil market and its impact on oil prices. Finally, the results of the 
rebalancing proxy exercise show that a decrease in investment in China also lowers investment 
in the MENA region through the oil channel, by pushing down oil prices. However, an increase 
in consumption demand somewhat offsets the adverse effects of the rebalancing, especially for 
oil importers, who benefit from the now-cheaper imports, and the increase in China’s import 
demand for consumption goods. 
 
Finally, the research in chapter Five is carried with regards to spillovers from the annual 
minimum wage increase of 3 percent in Japan, which was implemented in October 2016 with 
the intent to raise the minimum wage to 1000 Japanese Yen per hour by year 2020. The last 
chapter of this dissertation does not make use of the GVAR model. Instead, it employs a 
prefectural dataset for Japan to study domestic spillovers from the structural reforms 
implemented on the labor market in Japan. Specifically, we investigate the pass-through of the 
minimum wage (which is typically the earning wage of part-time workers), to average wages 
of full-time workers. Chapter Five therefore relates to the other chapters in this thesis through 
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the topic of spillovers, given that the literature concerning minimum wages typically decrees 
that changes in the level of minimum wage have “spillover” or “ripple” effects on the wage 
distribution, on employment and on inequality. To that extent, this research presents a 
framework which explains how an increase in the minimum wage could affect the wages of 
workers who earn at and above the minimum wage. This chapter is also written within a policy 
context: its main motivation is to investigate whether increasing the minimum wage could lead 
to a growth in nominal wages, which is considered a key factor for breaking the deflationary 
cycle in Japan 6F7.  
Studies related to the impact of the minimum wage on the labor market in Japan are scarce. A 
notable contribution is by Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2013), who use women’s 
wage percentile data on a national level to assess the impact of a minimum wage increase in a 
deflationary period between 1994 and 2003. We contribute to the literature by measuring the 
pass-through of the real minimum wage on total wages, men’s wages, and women’s wages in 
Japan using an updated panel dataset from 1997 to 2014. This study is the first, to the best of 
our knowledge, to look at the spillovers from an increase in the minimum wage on the wage 
distribution on a gender-based level, for men and women in Japan respectively, and on an 
average total level. By looking at spillovers from an increase in the minimum wage on the 
wage distribution for each gender group, we highlight the difference in pass-through between 
men and women in Japan. Our research is also the first, to the best of our knowledge, to employ 
a panel dataset of Japan’s 47 prefectures: it takes advantage of the availability of prefectural 
data for male and female earners respectively to demonstrate how the pass-through from the 
                                                 
7 Everaert and Ganelli (2016). 
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minimum wage to average wages is different for each gender group, but also to identify labor 
trends in the Japanese work-force. A panel dataset allows us to control for random and time-
invariant effects. It also allows us to make use of a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) 
Instrumental Variables regression to control for endogeneity which may arise in the prefectural 
dataset. Additionally, we contribute to the 2SLS literature by offering a novel instrument (to 
the best of our knowledge) for controlling endogeneity in the dataset, which complies with the 
theoretical condition that it should lead to a change in the regressor without affecting the 
dependent variable, but also passes the technical tests for instrument validity.     
The results indicate that an increase in the minimum wage would help increase average wages 
in Japan.  The regression results suggest that a 1 percent increase in the hourly minimum wage 
could increase the hourly average wage by as much as 0.48 percent. They also show that wages 
for men could increase by 0.6 percent as well, while women’s wages could increase by 0.4 
percent. However, the findings imply that while the increase in the minimum wage planned by 
the government can help stimulate average wage growth, the quantitative impact might fall 
short of the vigorous wage dynamics that Japan needs to escape deflation.  
Our results also capture some labor trends in the Japanese work-force: the regression reveals 
that women’s average age is negatively correlated to their wages, while for men, their age has 
a positive impact on their wages. This is indicative of the traditional seniority wage system in 
Japan, where workers’ wages grow in accordance to the length of their period of their 
employment in their workplace, rather than by their productivity. On additional way to 
interpret these results is that women may be left out from the seniority based pay increase 
because many of them drop out of the work force after bearing children. Another implication 
from the results, namely the lower pass-through of the minimum wage to average wages for 
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women, is that factors such as the tax deduction for spouses, which places an income cap on 
the second earner in a Japanese household (typically the woman), may be discouraging women 
from working longer hours or re-entering the work force. Other discouraging factors could be 
the lack of support with regards to childcare facilities to women when they are working.   
Together, these chapters try to illustrate in a comprehensive manner the implications of a policy 
shock both on a domestic and international level. When relevant, policy recommendations are 
also given in accordance to the results obtained, in such a way that countries affected by 
spillovers can take advantages of the opportunities brought by the changing of economic 
conditions, while mitigating whatever adverse effects from the spillovers.  
Keeping all the above in mind, we are ready to provide a detailed presentation of the contents 
of this thesis.  
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 CHAPTER 1. THE GLOBAL VAR MODEL 
 
 
 The GVAR Model Framework 
In this chapter, we discuss the econometric framework of the GVAR model, which is used for 
empirical estimation in chapters 2, 3 and 4. This model was first proposed by Pesaran, 
Schuermann and Weiner (2004, hence PSW), and further developed by Dees, diMauro, 
Pesaran and Smith (2007, henceforth DdPS). The GVAR framework is well suited to 
examining spillovers because it allows us to model country-specific dynamics, while also 
allowing for cointegration among variables. This chapter provides a detailed explanation to the 
GVAR model.  
 
Assume an N number of countries 𝑖 = 0, 1…𝑁 to be included in the model. For each country, 
a t number of domestic variables 𝑡 = 1, 2… 𝑡  such as GDP, inflation, equity prices, etc… are 
collected into a  𝑥𝑖𝑡: 𝑘𝑖  × 1  vector of domestic variables. Accordingly, an 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ : 𝑘𝑖
∗  × 1 vector 
of foreign variables is built for each 𝑥𝑖𝑡, where:  
 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0
, 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0 
(1) 
   
With 𝑤𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 = 0,1, … ,𝑁 a set of weights such that ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1
𝑁
𝑗=0   
 
Then for each country, a VARX*(2, 2) structure will be constructed, where: 
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 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖0 + 𝑎𝑖1𝑡 +  Φ𝑖1𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 +  Φ𝑖2𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2 +∧𝑖0 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + ∧𝑖1 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + ∧𝑖2 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2
∗
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
(2) 
With the 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  cross-sectionally weakly correlated such that û𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=0  
𝑝
→∞   ( 
𝑝
→ 
denotes convergence in probability).  
 
We therefore can write the error correction form of the VARX*(2,2) specification as such: 
 ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖0 − 𝛼𝑖𝛽
′
𝑖
[𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑖(𝑡 − 1)] + Λ𝑖0∆𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + Γ𝑖 ∆𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  , 
 
(3) 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗′) , 
 𝛼𝑖is a 𝑘𝑖 × 𝑟𝑖 matrix of rank 𝑟𝑖  
and 𝛽𝑖 is a (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘
∗
𝑖)  ×  𝑟𝑖 matrix of rank 𝑟𝑖.  
 
 𝛽𝑖 is then partitioned as 𝛽𝑖 = (𝛽
′
𝑖𝑥
, 𝛽′
𝑖𝑥∗
)′ conformable to 𝑧𝑖𝑡,in order to write the  𝑟𝑖 error 
correction terms as  
 𝛽′
𝑖
(𝑧𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽
′
𝑖𝑥
𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑥∗𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ − (𝛽′
𝑖
− 𝛾𝑖)𝑡 , 
 
(4) 
The foreign variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  and the global variables are estimated to be (1) weakly exogenous 
variables: they are treated as ‘long-forcing’ with respect to the domestic variables of the 
VARX* model, i.e. there is no long-run feedback from the domestic variables to the foreign 
variables. All variables are tested for the presence of unit root by using the weighted symmetric 
ADF tests. With the use of the weak exogeneity test, we can check which foreign variables to 
include in our estimation. 
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Next, reduced rank regression is used in order to obtain the number of cointegrating relations 
𝑟𝑖 , the speed of adjustment coefficients 𝛼𝑖, and the cointegrating vectors 𝛽𝑖 for each country’s 
VARX*.  The rank orders are obtained by Johansen’s trace statistic. Thus, each VARX* is 
estimated, allowing for cointegrating within the domestic variables  𝑥𝑖𝑡  , and between the 
domestic and foreign variables  𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  . 
 
Once 𝛽𝑖 is estimated, the remaining parameters of each country’s VARX* can be obtained by 
OLS, using the following equation:  
 ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖0 + 𝛿𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛬𝑖0𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛤𝑖𝛥𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, (5) 
 
With 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 as the model correction terms according to the 𝑟𝑖 cointegrating relations of the 
ith country model. 
 
The lag order for domestic variables (𝑝𝑖) and foreign variables (𝑞𝑖) that are included in each 
country’s VARX* model is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), subject to 
a maximum lag order of 𝑝𝑖 that we chose (with  𝑝𝑖 = 4 for chapter 2 and 𝑝𝑖= 2 for chapter 3 
and 4) 
 
Once each country-specific VARX* model is estimated, we can solve the GVAR model for 
the world as a whole: when the GVAR is solved for the world as a whole, all the variables 
become endogenous to the system, i.e. the GVAR model is expressed in terms of a  𝑘 ×  1 
global variable vector, 𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=0   
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By calling on 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ ) , we can rewrite each economy’s VECMX model as: 
 𝐴𝑖0𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖0 + 𝑎𝑖1𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖1𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  , (6) 
Where 
        𝐴𝑖0 = (Ι𝑘𝑖 , −Λ𝑖0),    𝐴𝑖𝑗 = (Φ𝑖𝑗 , Λ𝑖𝑗)  for 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝𝑖 
We then use the weights 𝑤𝑖𝑗, which we obtained from the trade or financial flows, in order to 
create the link matrix 𝑊𝑖 .  Using the link matrix  𝑊𝑖 , we obtain the identity: 
 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑡 , (7) 
Where 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥
′
0𝑡, 𝑥
′
1𝑡, … , 𝑥
′
𝑁𝑡)’ is the 𝑘 × 1 vector of all endogenous variables of the system, 
and 𝑊𝑖 is the (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖
∗) × 𝑘 matrix that captures all bilateral exposures between the countries 
in the dataset.  
 
Finally, the individual models are stacked together to make the global model 𝑥𝑡  , which 
contains all the variables and is given by: 
 𝐺𝑜𝑥𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑡 + 𝐺1𝑥𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐺𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡 (8) 
where,  
  𝐺0 =
(
 
 𝐴00𝑊0
𝐴10𝑊1
⋮
𝐴𝑁0𝑊𝑁)
 
 
,  𝐺𝑗 =
(
 
 
𝐴0𝑗𝑊0
𝐴1𝑗𝑊1
⋮
𝐴𝑁𝑗𝑊𝑁)
 
 
,  for 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝 
  𝑎0 = (
𝑎00
𝑎10
⋮
𝑎𝑁0
) ,  𝑎1 = (
𝑎01
𝑎11
⋮
𝑎𝑁1
) , 𝑢𝑡 = (
𝑢0𝑡
𝑢1𝑡
⋮
𝑢𝑁𝑡
) 
with 𝑝 = max(max 𝑝𝑖 , max 𝑞𝑖) 
Premultiplying Equation 8 by 𝐺0
−1 , the GVAR(p) model can be expressed as  
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 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑡 + 𝐹1𝑥𝑡−1 +⋯+ 𝐹𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡 , (9) 
 where  
𝑏0 = 𝐺0
−1𝑎0 , 𝑏1 = 𝐺0
−1𝑎1, 
𝐹𝑗 = 𝐺0
−1𝐺𝑗  , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝 ,   𝜀𝑡 = 𝐺0
−1𝑢𝑡   
 
Equation (9) can be solved recursively and impulse response and variance decomposition 
analysis can then be performed.  
 
 GVAR Estimation 
We use the GVAR toolbox by Vanessa Smith and Alesandro Galesi 7F8 to estimate our model. 
The order of integration for foreign and domestic variables is obtained by testing for unit root. 
All variables are tested with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test as well as the Weight 
Symmetric ADF test on levels, first and second differences.. We find that for most the variables 
used in this thesis, the hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected. All variables are tested for 
weak exogeneity, and most of the foreign variables are weakly exogenous. Choosing to exclude 
                                                 
8 The GVAR toolbox is available for download from wwwcfap.jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/gvartoolbox/index.html. 
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non-exogenous variables from the VARX* specification has no statistically significant impact 
on the results. Results for the weak exogeneity test are provided as supporting material.  
The trend coefficients are restricted to lie in the cointegrating space, and the intercepts are left 
unrestricted. (This is case IV in the GVAR toolbox).  
 
In addition, our model satisfies the additional requirements indicated by PSW (2004): 
• The GVAR is stable: the eigenvalues of the F matrix in (9) lie on or inside the unit 
circle. 
• The weights are relatively small: PSW states that the weights must be small such that 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
2𝑁
𝑗=1 → 0 as 𝑁 → ∞ .  Most of our weights satisfy this condition. 
• The idiosyncratic shocks are weakly correlated. We can check for weak correlation by 
calculating the average pair-wise cross-section correlation between residuals and 
variables. The VECMX* residuals show low correlation among almost all variables.  
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 CHAPTER 2. SPILLOVERS FROM JAPAN’S UNCONVENTIONAL 
MONETARY POLICY 8F9 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the spillover effects of Japan’s unconventional monetary policy on 
emerging Asia. The main motivation for the analysis is that, while several papers have looked 
at the domestic and global impact of Quantitative Easing (QE) in the U.S., and at the domestic 
impact of Japan’s unconventional monetary policy, studies of the spillovers from the latter are 
scarce. Given the importance of Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) in 
Japan’s current macroeconomic policy framework, and the strong financial and trade linkages 
between Japan and neighboring countries, an analysis of spillovers from QQE is a highly 
relevant exercise.   
 
After Prime Minister Abe came into power in late 2012, Japan had been emerging from two 
decades of deflation and low growth, as the ambitious policy framework of Abenomics—
including macroeconomic stimuli and structural reforms—was put in place. However, with 
                                                 
9 The work discussed in this chapter has been published in the Economic Modelling journal in October 2017, 
accepted as ‘Spillovers from Japan’s Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Global VAR Approach’, by Nour Tawk 
and Giovanni Ganelli (gganelli@imf.org). The author of this thesis undertook the data collection, the econometric 
analysis for the research, and wrote the manuscript. Mr. Ganelli designed and supervised the research. Both 
authors edited the published manuscript.  Prior to that, a working paper related to this chapter was published as 
an IMF working paper WP/16/99 in May 2016, entitled “Spillovers from Japan’s Unconventional Monetary 
Policy to Emerging Asia: A Global VAR approach”, by Nour Tawk and Giovanni Ganelli (gganelli@imf.org)). 
However, the analytical work in the initial paper relied on orthogonalized shocks to calculate spillovers, while 
this chapter differs by using two alternative methods for the identification of monetary policy shock, including 
the use of sign restrictions.  
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interest rates at the zero lower bound, the power of traditional monetary policy tools had 
become limited. Consequently, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) embarked on new QE policies, which 
included the purchase of both risky assets and government securities. In April 2013, the newly 
appointed BoJ Governor Kuroda announced that QQE “… will double the monetary base and 
the amounts outstanding of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) as well as exchange traded 
funds (ETFs) in two years, and more than double the average remaining maturity of JGB 
purchases.” (Figure 2.1.D)   
 
Since the beginning of QQE and the launch of Abenomics, Japan has witnessed a strong 
depreciation of its currency (Figure 2.1.A), a significant surge in its equity prices (Figure 2.1.B), 
and a pick-up in inflation (Figure 2.1.C). By the end of 2016, the Japanese yen had depreciated 
from 82 Yen/USD in 2012 to 117 Yen/USD. Similarly, the Japan MSCI index’s value had 
risen from 450 points in 2012, closing at 914 points by December 2016, while both underlying 
inflation and inflation expectations came close to one percent. Meanwhile, compared to the 
first QE program in Japan that was launched in March 2001 and ended in March 2006, one can 
see that, though both QEs led to an increase in equity prices, the current QQE had a larger 
impact on inflation and the exchange rate.  
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Figure 2.1: The Japanese Economy through Abenomics and the First QE 
 
A. Depreciation of the Japanese 
Yen (Bilateral Exchange Rate)  
B. Surge in Equity Prices (MSCI 
Index) 
 
Source: IMF IFS 
 
Source: IMF IFS 
  
C- Modest Increase in the CPI Index D- The Expansion of the Monetary Base 
(Percent) 
 
Source: IMF IFS 9F10  
 
Source: IMF IFS 
  
                                                 
10 The consumer price index includes the temporary impact of the consumption tax increase.  
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The main interest of this research is to study how these developments in Japan may have 
affected emerging Asia. To do this, we assess potential spillover effects from QQE using a 
multi-country dataset to set up a Global VAR (GVAR) model. The GVAR framework, 
developed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004), allows examining the propagation of 
shocks through various macroeconomic linkages between countries. The methodology 
involves setting up country-specific individual VARs, and then linking them through the 
inclusion of foreign variables. The latter are weighted averages of the other countries’ variables, 
and they augment the individual country-specific VARs to capture the propagation of shocks.  
 
In addition to Japan, we include in our sample five ASEAN economies, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, as well as China and Korea. The choice of 
countries is dictated by the availability of data. We also include other countries including the 
U.S. and several European countries to control for the global impact of their respective policies, 
and because they are important trade and financial partners to Japan. Our GVAR model is 
therefore estimated for 29 countries, using monthly data on real GDP, CPI inflation, the 
exchange rate, bank credit to the private sector, equity prices, capital inflows, and short-term 
interest rates, from January 2000 up to September 2016. 
 
We carry out two exercises to identify the impact of QQE domestically and on the rest of the 
countries in our dataset. Given the challenge of identifying a monetary policy shock when 
interest rates are zero or negative, we look for other proxies that could identify spillovers from 
a monetary policy shock from Japan. More specifically, we look at the impact of QQE through 
different transmission channels: the conventional interest rate channel, and the stock market 
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channel. We first consider a shock to Japan’s shadow interest rate as a conventional monetary 
policy proxy. We then model the impact of unconventional monetary policy on stock prices 
through an increase in equity prices, identified via sign restriction. Using equity prices has the 
advantage of matching stylized facts (equity prices increased significantly during both first and 
second QQE periods in Japan) and of capturing the transmission channel of QQE on the stock 
market. In addition, to disentangle it from a regular financial shock, we use sign restrictions 
that are consistent with the existing literature for modeling a monetary policy shock.    
 
The main contribution of this research is to be the first to our knowledge to systematically 
quantify the spillovers from Japan’s QQE on emerging Asia. As mentioned above, studies of 
Japan’s QQE tend to focus mainly on the impact on Japan only. In addition, this research 
attempts to identify the effects of monetary policy on the stock market channel, by discerning 
the impact of equity price fluctuations caused by monetary policy shocks.   
 
Our results show that a negative shock to the shadow interest rate has a significant impact on 
the exchange rate, GDP and inflation for Japan, but it does not capture the significant increase 
in equity prices. We argue that this transmission channel is not likely to capture the effect of 
monetary policy on financial markets, and find evidence in the literature where the shadow 
interest rate is used, but significant spillovers are not found. On the other hand, a positive shock 
to Japanese equity prices identified by sign restrictions caused a temporary increase in equity 
prices across emerging Asian countries, as well as an appreciation of their currencies. Most 
ASEAN countries experienced a temporary increase in output. Capital inflows also rose for 
many countries in the first few months. Further, one way to interpret these results is that 
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international propagation of the effects of QQE worked broadly through its transmission to 
financial markets. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature.  
Section 2.3 explains the GVAR model’s setup and the data. Section 2.4 presents the impulse 
response analysis and an interpretation of the results. Section 2.5 discusses the counterfactual 
analysis for Japan’s QQE.  Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
 
  Literature Review  
From a theoretical point of view, we expect a priori that unconventional monetary policy (UMP) 
impacts the domestic economy through its effect on the stock market, exchange rates, portfolio 
flows, and interest rates. The increased liquidity in the market contributes to both lowering 
interest rates and depreciating the domestic currency, which could stimulate capital outflows 
as domestic investors search for higher yields abroad. At the same time, the transmission of 
monetary policy to financial markets, working through changed expectations of financial 
conditions due to the monetary stimulus, raises stock prices. The latter effect can also be 
magnified by domestic portfolio rebalancing away from bonds toward riskier assets.   
 
We expect these channels to also determine the international spillovers of UMP. Specifically, 
we expect QQE in Japan to generate spillovers to emerging economies through capital flows, 
currency appreciation, bond yields and increased stock price effects. Emerging Asian countries 
are expected to receive capital inflows as Japanese investors rebalance their portfolios in search 
of higher yields. Such inflows, as well as the yen depreciation due to monetary expansion in 
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Japan, contribute to exchange rate appreciation in emerging Asia, with possible negative 
effects on their net exports. The latter negative effect, however, could be more than offset by 
the increased confidence associated with QQE, which could boost stock prices in Japan but 
also in the region as a secondary effect. The variables which we include in our GVAR 
estimation are meant to capture these channels. 
 
There is a growing body of literature which analyzes spillovers from the U.S. and Europe’s 
UMPs. Most studies find cross-border spillover effects in the form of large capital inflows, 
currency appreciation, an increase in prices and interest rates, raised equity prices and 
temporary increases in output. In fact, several studies have shown that, in the aftermath of the 
subprime financial crisis, the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase program (LSAP) had a strong 
impact on the global economy: Bauer and Neely (2014) show that the Fed’s unconventional 
monetary policy announcements had a strong impact on international bond yields. Gambacorta, 
Hofman and Peersman (2014) use a panel structural VAR to show that the expansion in central 
bank balance sheets at the zero lower bound caused a temporary increase in prices and 
economic activity. They identify an unconventional monetary policy shock by imposing sign 
restrictions which dictate that shocks to the central banks’ balance sheet increase volatility in 
the market. Glick and Leduc (2012) present evidence on the depreciation of the US dollar and 
British pound, as well as of a decline in long-term interest rates, after announcements of LSAP. 
Ree and Choi (2014) examine the effects of Japan’s QQE on Korea and find that there was 
little impact on trade and capital flows. Ree, Hong and Choi (2015) find that the depreciation 
of the Japanese Yen could increase Japan’s price competitiveness in the long run, and may be 
detrimental to South Korean companies in case of an appreciation of the Won. IMF (2015) 
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highlights the appreciation of currencies of several countries in emerging Asia due to changes 
in monetary policies in Japan, Europe and the United States. 
 
Concerning UMP spillovers from Japan, several studies focus on the domestic impact of QQE: 
Fujiwara, Nakazono and Ueda (2014) examines the effect of QQE on inflation in Japan, and 
finds that inflation expectations rose modestly in the short run. Lam (2011) looks at financial 
indicators such as equity prices, sovereign and corporate bond yields, exchange rates and 
inflation, to assess the impact of QE by the BoJ in the 2000s. He finds that these policies had 
no effect on raising the inflation rate or depreciating the exchange rate, but did cause stock 
prices to rise strongly.  
 
Global VAR models have been widely used for the study of propagation of international shocks: 
Chen, Filardo, He, and Zhu (2015) employ a Global VAR model and find that U.S. QE 
contributed to an overheating of certain economies, as well as to currency appreciation and 
strong capital inflows to emerging countries. They also try to identify spillovers from US 
monetary policy using the Fed shadow interest rate, but their results show that the shadow 
interest rate only captures domestic spillovers. Dees, DiMauro, Pesaran and Smith (2007) 
provide the theoretical framework of the GVAR model to test the transmission of shocks from 
the U.S. to the rest of the world. They demonstrate that financial shocks were transmitted 
rapidly, and usually had a larger impact on equities and bond markets compared to GDP and 
inflation. Galesi and Sgherri (2009) use financial weights based on cross-border bank lending 
data to quantify the financial spillovers across Europe through a shock to U.S. equity prices. 
They find strong co-movements of equity prices across Europe, but heterogeneous responses 
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to bank credit that were country-specific. Sun, Heinz and Ho (2013) construct foreign variables 
from the combination of bilateral trade flows and banking exposures, to better capture the 
cross-country linkages between the Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) and 
advanced Europe countries.  
 
A large majority of the research uses sign restrictions for the identification of shocks: 
Eickmeyer and Ng (2011) use a GVAR to assess the impact of a tightening of credit in the US, 
Japan and Europe on the rest of the world by employing sign restrictions that specify a credit 
shock from a monetary one. Georgiadis (2016) employs a GVAR model to estimate the impact 
of a US monetary contraction. He imposes sign restrictions on short-term rates and inflation, 
following Eickmeyer and Ng (2011)’ identification method. Anaya, Hachula, and Offermanns 
(2017), using a GVAR, specify that a monetary expansion (defined by changes in the central 
bank’s balance sheet) would either decrease or not affect market volatility, whereas a negative 
financial shock would increase the volatility in the market. Feldkircher and Huber (2016) also 
investigate the impact of a US contractionary shock by imposing sign restrictions on output, 
price dynamics and interest rates. 
 
Finally, we reference the body of literature which explores the stock market channel, aka the 
channel which carries the transmission of monetary policy to financial markets. Neri (2004) 
explains that fluctuations in interest rates can impact stock prices and households’ wealth, and 
that this impact therefore creates “an additional channel, besides the traditional interest rate 
and credit one, through which monetary policy can affect output and inflation”. He employs a 
structural VAR with sign restrictions to disentangle monetary policy shocks from money 
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demand shocks on credit supply. Specifically, he identifies shocks to credit supply which are 
caused by monetary policy actions which are “orthogonal to the policy rate”, and dubs them as 
“unconventional monetary policy shocks”. Cooley and Quadrini (1999a) use a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model to investigate the effect of monetary policy through the 
stock market channel on firms. They find that a contractionary monetary shock had a negative 
impact on the stock market index. Lastrapes (1998) and Rapach (2001) employ structural 
VARs with sign restrictions and come to similar findings. Fornari and Stracca (2013) use sign 
restrictions on a panel VAR to distinguish financial shocks from demand shocks, monetary 
policy shocks, and non-financial shocks, and find different impulse responses to each exercise. 
 
 Data and VARX Setup 
 Data 
Our dataset comprises monthly data, from January 2000 up to September 2016. The following 
country-specific variables are used for the construction of the variables that are used in the 
GVAR model: real GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), equity prices (𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡), CPI inflation (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡), bank credit 
(𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡), the short-term interest rate (𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡), the exchange rate (𝐸𝑖𝑡), and capital inflows (𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡). 
However, only in the case of Japan, we replace the data series for the short-term rate by the 
shadow interest rate 10F11. Further details on the shadow interest rate are provided in section 2.3.4. 
Finally, the price of oil and the index price of metals are used as global variables. GDP data 
                                                 
11 Data for the shadow interest rate are publicly available on the Federal Bank of New Zealand website, on the 
following link: http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research-and-publications/research-programme/additional-
research/measures-of-the-stance-of-united-states-monetary-policy/comparison-of-international-monetary-
policy-measures.  
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refers to real GDP index data, obtained from the IMF IFS on a quarterly basis. Therefore, as 
conventional in the literature, we converted real GDP to monthly frequency by using the Chow-
Lin interpolation method (with the industrial production index as a reference). Table 2.1 lists 
the countries that are included in our estimation.  
 
Table 2.1 Countries and regions included in the GVAR model 
     
Asia and Pacific  North America  Europe 
Australia  Canada  Austria 
China  Mexico  Belgium 
India  United States  Finland 
Indonesia    France 
Japan  South America  Germany 
Korea  Brazil  Italy 
Malaysia  Chile  Netherlands 
New Zealand  Peru  Norway 
Philippines    Spain 
Singapore    Sweden 
Thailand    Switzerland 
    Turkey 
    United Kingdom 
     
     
Note: The countries in Italics are included in the Euro area block. 
 
For all countries except the United States, the exchange rate variable used is the bilateral rate 
vis-à-vis the United States Dollar, obtained from Bloomberg. We used the IFS consumer 
producer index (CPI) for all items (with 2010 as the index year). For equity prices, the MSCI 
index specific to each country is used. Finally, we use gross capital flows at month end as a 
proxy for capital inflows. The series are then seasonally adjusted. 11F 12  We constructed the 
variables for study as follows: 
                                                 
12 Further details about the data are included in the data appendix. 
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Real GDP: 𝑦 = ln
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Inflation: 𝑑𝑝 = ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) 
Equity prices: 𝑒𝑞 = ln(
𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
) 
The exchange rate: 𝑒𝑥 = ln(
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
) 
The short − term interest rate: 𝑟 =  0.25 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡13/100) 
Bank credit: 𝑏𝑐 = ln
𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
 
Price of oil: 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙 = ln 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙 
 
Price of metal: 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ln 𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
Capital inflows: 𝑐𝑓 = ln
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
  
 
 The Weighting Schemes of the GVAR Model 
A key step of the GVAR model is the inclusion of the foreign variables. For each domestic 
variable of each country in our sample, the corresponding foreign variable is built based on a 
weighted average of the corresponding variables of its partners. The weighting scheme is 
usually chosen to highlight the economic relationship of a country with another country. The 
weights on which the foreign variables are built are based on the countries’ financial and trade 
exposures vis-à-vis the other countries, and therefore determine their respective importance 
towards one another. For instance, if the trade weights between Japan and Indonesia are large, 
                                                 
13 When calculating 𝑟 for Japan’s VECM, the shadow interest rate is used instead of the short-term interest rate.  
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then the foreign variable for Japan’s GDP in Indonesia’s specific VARX will have a larger 
weight. A shock to Japan’s output will therefore have a higher impact on the Indonesia VARX. 
 
Concerning the choice of transmission channels, we followed the common literature and use 
trade flows for building our weights. To examine spillovers through the trade channel, we 
combined imports and exports from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. As a robustness 
check, we also created weights using Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows from the IMF’s 
Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) and ran the GVAR with trade weights and FDI 
weights separately. This exercise yields comparable results to our findings when we combined 
the trade and FDI channels together , which suggests that the choice of weights is of secondary 
importance. 13F14  
 
The bilateral trade weights are computed from the sum of imports and exports between each 
country. We opted to construct fixed weights for 2012-2014. We found that changing the time 
frame for the construction of weights does not lead to significant changes in the results. 
 
 
 Unconventional Monetary Policy Shock Identification 
The existing literature on the impact of QE typically uses reductions in interest rates as a proxy 
for monetary policy shocks. For example, Chen et al. (2015) use the US term spread (between 
the 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields) and the US corporate spread (between the Bank of 
of America-Merrill Lynch US corporate AAA bond yield and the effective federal funds rate) 
                                                 
14 Cashin, Mohaddes, and Raissi (2016), also test the propagation of shocks using trade weights and FDI 
weights, and find that the choice of weights is not of high importance.  
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to examine the impact of the Fed’s QE on the rest of the world. Dees et al. (2007) compute the 
monetary policy shock as a cut to the US short-term interest rate. The idea behind this modeling 
choice is that, with an increase in the supply of money pushing down interest rates, the demand 
for money will be stimulated.  
However, if both the long-term interest rate and the short-term interest rate are already at or 
close to the zero lower bound, using the term spread or the corporate spread as a monetary 
policy indicator is not a viable strategy.  As noted by Eggertsson (2008), with conventional 
monetary policy, a higher money supply increases demand only through lower interest rates. 
Therefore, at the zero lower bound, a decline in the interest rate creates no significant impact 
on the money supply. Rather, unconventional monetary policy must work through the 
expectation of future money supply, and thus future interest rates, so that the money supply 
affects spending. Krugman (2015), elaborates that in a liquidity trap, the expansion of the 
monetary base itself will not have an inflationary impact as it will not affect the current 
liquidity (Figure 2.2), but that future inflation is dependent on whether investors believe that 
the central bank will continue its easing even as the economy begins to recover. 
 
Figure 2.2 Japan’s Monetary Base and Money Aggregates (Base year 2010=100)  
 
Source: The Federal Reserve of St. Louis and Author’s estimations  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Money Aggregates Monetary Base
41 
 
Therefore, studies of UMP spillovers for advanced economies have increasingly relied on other 
proxies for monetary policy shocks, when interest rates became at the zero lower bound. For 
instance, there is a vast literature that employs the short-term shadow interest rate as a proxy 
for unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound. Krippner (2013,2015) measures 
the stance of monetary policy at the zero lower bound by calculating the shadow interest rate 
for Japan and the United States. Wu and Xia (2013,2015) calculate the shadow interest rate for 
the federal funds rate, and employ it in a factor-augmented VAR to measure the effects of 
monetary policy at the zero lower bound. Chen et al. (2015) employ short-run sign restrictions 
on Wu and Xia’s Federal Funds shadow interest rate to identify monetary policy shocks from 
the Fed. However, their estimation could only capture the domestic impact of UMP, and they 
did not observe international spillovers. Lombardi and Zhu (2014) calculate the shadow 
interest rate for the US economy and use it in a structural VAR model to identify monetary 
policy shocks. Kucharcukova et al (2016) calculate spillovers from the ECB’s monetary policy 
stance to outside the euro area, creating an index equivalent to the shadow interest rate for the 
ECB.   
 
We therefore choose to model the shock of Japan’s QQE through two alternative proxies: a 
negative shock to the shadow interest rate, and an equity price shock identified through sign 
restrictions. 
One way to identify unconventional monetary policy is through a negative shock to the shadow 
interest rate, a method which has been widely adopted in the literature for monetary policy at 
the zero lower bound. 
Another way to identify a monetary policy shock is through the stock market channel, as it 
highlights the transmission mechanism of monetary policy on stock prices. The stock market 
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channel can also somewhat capture investors’ positioning on financial markets, given that 
fluctuations in stock prices also are largely driven by investors’ perception of expectations. 
Additionally, Japan’s quantitative easing programs highlight the stock market channel, as 
Japan experienced a significant increase in equity prices during both quantitative easing 
programs. For example, Hosono and Isobe (2014) employ an event study approach using daily 
data to analyze the impact of monetary policy announcements on financial variables. They find 
that the BOJ’s QQE policies had a substantial prolonged effect on stock prices. Ueda (2012) 
analyses the long-term effects of the BoJ’s announcements on the stock market, 10-year JGB 
yields and the JPY/USD exchange rate. He also finds that the announcements of the BOJ had 
a significant and permanent impact on asset prices.    
 
As above-mentioned, an equity price shock also captures the stylized fact that, during both the 
first QE and the current QQE of Japan, there was a noticeable surge in equity prices in Japan. 
Further, by applying sign restrictions, we can disentangle a monetary-driven shock from a 
financial shock. Finally, by disentangling the monetary policy shock of QQE, we can observe 
whether there were any consequent spillovers via the stock market channel.  
 
 Identification Via the Shadow Interest Rate 
The shadow interest rate became widely used after the global financial crisis to track the policy 
rate, after the US Federal Reserve lowered the fed funds rate to zero, bounding the traditional 
monetary policy instrument to the “zero lower bound”. After the federal funds rate reached 
zero, the traditional policy rate instrument could no longer be used in econometric models, and 
the impact of the policy rate on other macro and financial variables could no longer be observed. 
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As a result, researchers developed a “shadow rate” to the policy rate, which has the 
characteristic that it can decline below the zero lower bound, into negative territory. Essentially, 
the shadow interest rate exhibits the time-series properties of the short-term interest rate and is 
equal to it when the latter is positive. However, when the short-term rate is at the zero lower 
bound, the shadow interest rate can become negative to indicate a more accommodative stance 
of monetary policy than a zero-policy rate.  
 
A popular approach to estimating the short-term rate is using a dynamic structure model. 
Studies as such include Ichiue and Ueno (2006,2007,2013,2015), Krippner (2012,2013,2015, 
2016), and Wu and Xia (2016), Kim and Singleton (2012), and Bauer and Rudebusch (2013). 
Such research applies nonlinear filtering techniques to the shadow interest rate term structure 
models, first proposed by Black (1995).  Black (1995) was the first to propose a shadow interest 
rate short-term structure model (SRTSM), which creates a shadow interest rate which is linear 
in Gaussian factors, that is bound by zero and the short-term interest rate. Wu and Xia (2013, 
2016) offer a SRTSM using bond prices to track the federal funds rate that can breach the zero 
lower bound, which they find is excellent at tracking the behavior of interest rates. They use 
the shadow interest rate in a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) to measure the 
effects of monetary policy at the zero-lower bound.  
 
Krippner (2012, 2013, 2015) uses a continuous-time Gaussian affine term structure model 
which imposes the zero lower bound by using a call option on shadow bonds to calculate the 
shadow interest rate for the federal funds rate. The model reproduces Black’s SRTSM 
framework for modeling the lower bound mechanism, and then uses an arbitrage-free Nelson 
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and Siegel (1987) model (ANSM) with two-state variables (level and slope) to represent the 
shadow yield curve. Krippner explains that the ANSM model can provide a parsimonious 
approximation to any Gaussian affine term structure model, regardless of the model’s 
specification. He also states that choosing two factors for the model delivers robust results for 
the shadow interest rate estimates which are also less volatile, more comparable between 
economies, and available at a daily frequency14F15. Krippner (2015) provides frequently updated 
estimates of the shadow interest rate for Japan’s policy rate on the central bank of New Zealand 
website, while Wu and Xia (2013,2016) publicly provide their updated estimates of the Federal 
funds rate shadow interest rate on the reserve bank of Atlanta website. Both estimates are 
widely used in the literature, whether for deriving a shadow interest rate, or for estimating 
unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound. Christensen and Rudebusch (2014) 
calculate the shadow interest rate based on derivations from the Krippner (2012,2013,2015) 
method. Wu and Xia (2013), independently derive a bond-price approximation that is 
equivalent to the Krippner method. Francis et al. (2017) test whether Krippner (2015) and Wu 
and Xia (2016)’s shadow interest rates can be considered substitutes for policy rates in standard 
VARs and find them good proxies for monetary policy instruments. McCoy and Clemens 
(2017) also apply Krippner’s shadow interest rate model to derive a shadow interest rate model 
                                                 
15 The ANSM is specified by Krippner with a fixed lower bound parameter of 12.5 basis points, and 
homoscedastic residuals.  
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for the euro area. Therefore, and based on the wide usage of the Krippner method, we rely on 
his publicly available estimates of Japan’s shadow interest rate for our GVAR estimation.  
 
 Identification Via Sign Restriction 
Identification of UMP in the case of Japan is a challenging task. First and foremost, negative 
inflation expectations have been so entrenched in the Japanese market, that it would be 
debatable to impose sign restrictions on inflation. In addition, as shown in figure 2.2, given 
that Japan was already in a liquidity trap with interest rates at the zero bound, the changes in 
the BOJ’s balance sheet did not have an impact on the monetary aggregates in the economy, 
and thus would not be a suitable proxy15F16. Fluctuations of equity prices, however, are driven by 
prospects of growth. In the absence of a bubble, large increases in equity prices- not-
withstanding exogenous shocks that are not domestically driven - can be explained by investors’ 
positive expectations of future profits, or increased interest rates, or higher inflation 
expectations. In the absence of long-term inflation expectation swaps series, we can measure 
the impact of QQE on financial markets by identifying it from the equity price boom. 
 
In terms of identifying the shock from QQE to equity prices, we follow the identification 
method of Fornari and Stracca (2013), who differentiate between a monetary and financial 
shock. They argue that in addition to its positive impact on stock prices, a positive financial 
shock would lead to higher demand for credit by the private sector and higher investment, 
                                                 
16 In addition, if in the case of the US economy, the literature argues that volatility in the market should 
decrease following a monetary expansion, data for the Nikkei volatility index shows that at the contrary, 
volatility increased around the time of the launch of Abenomics. This discourages us from including volatility 
in our analysis, and applying to it sign restrictions.  
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therefore pushing up interest rates. They thus distinguish a financial shock from an 
expansionary monetary shock by imposing that the reaction of interest rates to an equity price 
shock be non-negative.  
 
A monetary expansion, on the other hand, pushes down short-term rates as it increases liquidity 
in an economy. Therefore, short-term rates are expected to have a negative reaction to a 
positive monetary shock. However, we do not impose any restrictions to credit to the private 
sector, as it may increase, or remain unchanged.  
To that extent, Table 2.2 illustrates how sign restrictions could be used to differentiate a 
monetary shock from a financial shock. We apply the sign restrictions referring to the monetary 
policy shock in Table 2.2 to Japan’s cointegrating vectors. The results are reported in the 
following section. 16F17 
 
 
Table 2.2. Sign Restrictions on Japan’s Cointegrating Vectors 
 
 Monetary Policy Shock Financial Shock 
GDP   
Inflation   
Equity Prices >0 >0 
Exchange Rate >0  
Credit to Private 
Sector 
 >0 
Interest Rate <0 >0 
Capital Flows   
 
 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check, sign restrictions per a financial shock are also applied and impulse responses are 
computed, yielding predictably different results.  
47 
 
 VARX Setups 
Except for Japan and the U.S., each country’s VARX model includes the 8 domestic 
endogenous variables: GDP (y), CPI inflation (dp), equity prices (eq), bank credit (bc), short-
term interest rates (r), the exchange rate (ex), and capital inflows (cf). The VARs are then 
augmented with the set of foreign (weakly exogenous) variables built on the flows channel, 
e.g. y* or dp*, and our global variables, the price of oil, and the price of metal. All foreign 
variables except the price of oil are built as the weighted averages of the respective variables 
of the rest of the countries, with the weights determined through the flows channel. 
 
The U.S. VARX vector includes all the domestic variables except for the exchange rate. 
However, only y* and ex* enter as foreign variables in the U.S. VARX* setup. As conventional 
in the literature, foreign variables are not included to reflect the dominant role of the U.S. in 
the world economy: the U.S. affects foreign economies but is not affected by them. As for the 
Japan VARX*, it is set up like all the other VARX* in the model, except that the time-series 
used for the short-term rate is the shadow interest rate. Finally, the price of oil is specified as 
an endogenous variable in the U.S. VARX*, while the price of metals is specified as 
endogenous to the China VARX*. The lag orders for the domestic and foreign variables are 
determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Consistent with GVAR literature, 
we set the maximum lag orders to  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 4 and  𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2.  The number of cointegrating 
relations is next determined for each country VARX*, and the rank orders obtained using 
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Johansen’s trace statistics. The estimated VARX* orders and their corresponding ranks are 
reported in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3. Lag Orders of the Country-Specific VARX*(p,q) Models Together with the 
Number of Cointegrating Relations (r) 
 
Country VARX* Order  
𝑝𝑖             𝑞𝑖 
Cointegrating 
Relations (𝑟𝑖) 
Country VARX* Order  
𝑝𝑖             𝑞𝑖 
Cointegrating 
Relations (𝑟𝑖) 
      
Australia 3 1 3 New Zealand 4 1 2 
Brazil 2 1 3 Norway 1 1 2 
Canada 1 1 2 Peru 1 1 4 
Chile 1 1 2 Philippines 1 1 2 
China 4 2 5 Singapore 4 1 3 
Euro 2 1 2 Sweden 3 2 3 
India 1 1 1 Switzerland 4 1 2 
Indonesia 2 1 4 Thailand 4 1 3 
Japan 3 2 4 Turkey 4 1 2 
Korea 
3 1 5 
United 
Kingdom 3 1 
2 
Malaysia 4 1 3 United States 4 1 2 
Mexico 1 1 3     
Note: 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 refer to the lag order of the domestic and foreign variables respectively and are determined 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), with the maximum lag for order for the domestic variables 
set to 4, and the maximum lag order for foreign variables set to 2. The number of cointegrating relations (𝑟𝑖) 
are determined using the trace statistic based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991) for all 
countries. Source: Author’s estimations 
 
 Dynamic Analysis 
 Structural Impulse Response 
To estimate orthogonal impulse responses, we identify a shock to the shadow interest rate 
using a recursive Cholesky scheme. Dees et al. (2007) employed structural impulse responses 
through a Cholesky factorization schemes for the specification of shocks. Following Dees et 
al.  (2007), we chose one possible identiﬁcation scheme by adopting the following ordering 
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of the variables in the Japan bloc: short-term shadow interest rate, equity prices, the exchange 
rate, bank credit, capital inflows, inflation, and output. We experimented with several variable 
orderings (we placed equity prices as the last variable in the bloc, and then second in the 
ordering) and our results are largely robust. 17F18 The country ordering is invariant for the GVAR 
model18F19, when using structural impulse responses. Further, we employ the short-run sign 
restrictions shown in Table 2.2 when we compute a shock to equity prices. 
 Impulse Response Results  
2.4.2.1 One Negative Standard Deviation Shock to Japan’s Interest Rates  
 
We first modeled our monetary policy shock using the shadow short-term rate, given that the 
short-term interest rate was had been around zero for years before breaking the lower bound 
into negative rates in 2016.  
The results, reported in Figure 2.3, show that a one percent decrease in the shadow interest rate 
has a statistically significant positive impact on Japan’s GDP, and causes a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, as well as a slight increase in inflation. The impact on equity prices and capital 
inflows however is not statistically significant, which suggests that this proxy may not be 
capturing all the impact that QQE had on the domestic market. In addition, we report no 
                                                 
18 We also try the alternative ordering described in Dees et al. (2007) by placing the policy variable as the last in 
the ordering block, and the results consistent with our first ordering. We also tried placing equity prices as the 
second variable in the ordering block. 
19 The GVAR code can only be run using the toolbox provided by Smith and Galesi, which comes with a 
detailed guide and an Excel template, which must be filled with much precision, for the code to run smoothly. 
When referring to the listing of countries using a SGVAR, in the toolbox guide, on page 88, the authors state 
that structural impulse responses can be run with only one country listed in the code column.   To that extent, 
we cannot list other countries in any order when using the SGVAR. In addition, we cannot use the dominant 
unit function, as it is recommended for use only for the United States economy. 
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statistically significant impulse responses on other countries in the dataset. Given that other 
studies which have used the shadow short term interest rate as a proxy for UMP in the United 
States have also reported that this proxy did not seem to capture international spillovers, we 
consider the additional exercise of identifying a monetary policy shock through sign 
restrictions. 
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Figure 2.3: Structural generalized impulse responses of a Negative One Standard Deviation shock 
to Japan’s shadow short-term interest rate, (Bootstrap mean estimates with 90 percent confidence 
bounds) 
 
GDP Exchange Rate 
  
  
Equity Prices Inflation 
  
  
Capital Inflows Credit to the Private Sector 
  
  
Note: Figures are median structural generalized impulse responses to one negative standard deviation shock 
in Japan’s short-term shadow interest rate, with the corresponding 90th percent confidence bounds. The 
impact is in percentage and the horizon is monthly. 
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2.4.2.2 One Positive Standard Deviation Shock to Japan’s Equity Prices  
Figure 2.4 shows the responses of one positive standard deviation shock to Japan’s equity 
prices, identified from a standard financial shock via sign restrictions. The median estimates 
are reported in solid lines, while dotted lines show the 90 percent confidence bands.  
 
Regarding the domestic impact of Japanese QQE, our results suggest that it caused a 
temporary equity price boom, an economic recovery, depreciation of the yen, but with limited 
impact on inflation. GDP increased by 0.1 percent. Equity prices rose approximately by 0.5 
percent. 19 F20 Inflation picked up slightly by 0.05 percent, with the increase not being statistically 
significant. Bank credit was largely unmoved. The exchange rate depreciated by 0.6 percent, 
and remained at those levels for the remaining periods. The strongest short-term impact was 
in terms of capital inflows, which in the first two periods increased by about 2 percent in Japan. 
This increase in capital inflows can be interpreted as a short-run impact of Abenomics on 
investor confidence, as the significant monetary stimulus, with higher equity prices, may have 
affected expectations of higher future earnings and driven in foreign investors. 
  
Turning to spillovers, our results suggest that QQE had a short-term impact on emerging Asia, 
and caused statistically significant increase in equity prices in the first few periods. For China, 
Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, the increase was in the 1-2 percent 
range. This highlights the financial linkages between financial markets in emerging Asia and 
in Japan, through which positive spillovers would have propagated.  
                                                 
20 All variables are in natural logarithm, and are first adjusted to inflation.  
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Figure 2.4 also shows that, most of the countries in emerging Asia experienced appreciation of 
their currency on impact. Per the traditional expenditure switching effect, this should result in 
an increase in Japan’s net exports to the other countries. Despite this, the impact of QQE on 
growth in the GDP of the other countries was generally positive, and for Korea, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, statistically significant, suggesting that the switching away from 
domestic goods toward Japanese ones did not happen. This result is consistent with recent 
evidence that, due to off-shore production of Japanese products, Japanese exports have become 
less sensitive to the exchange rate (see Kang 2015). Indeed, Japan’s net exports only changed 
from -117 to -120 billion U.S. dollars from 2013 to 2014. Furthermore, higher equity prices 
could also have boosted consumption through a wealth effect in emerging Asia by raising the 
outlook for future growth.  
 
One way to interpret our results is that the positive spillovers from QQE more than 
compensated the negative expenditure switching effect, by stimulating growth in other 
countries. We expect that the positive effect of QQE on Japan’s GDP to have positively 
affected growth in other countries through higher demand for their exports.  
 
The impact on China illustrates how the confidence channel can dominate the exchange rate 
channel. The trade and financial linkages between Japan and China are amongst the strongest 
in the sample, but, even though China experienced an appreciation of its currency, the effect 
on GDP was positive, though not significant. In fact, the Japanese Yen depreciation and 
corresponding RMB appreciation brings a benefit of lower import costs of intermediate inputs 
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given that Japan is one of the most important intermediate input suppliers for China in the 
global value chain. In other words, despite the depreciation of the Yen and the appreciation of 
the RMB, the overall spillover impact of QQE on China’s GDP was not negative, due to 
increased confidence as illustrated by the increase in equity prices, and a reduction in import 
costs.  
Effects on capital inflows were less heterogeneous. For most countries, we observed a spike in 
the already present influx of flows to emerging Asia in the first month after Abenomics. Capital 
inflows tended to peak in the first two periods, between 1-2 percent in most countries, before 
going back to close to their original levels. This increase was statistically significant for most 
countries only for the first period, suggesting that the impact of Abenomics on capital flows 
was limited. As for China, we registered a gradual decline in capital flows. This could be 
because foreign investors were redirecting their investments towards Japan. Moreover, the 
large presence of Japanese companies in Indonesia and Thailand could explain a spillover of 
capital inflows into those countries 
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Figure 2.4: Structural generalized impulse responses of a Positive unit (+1𝜎) shock to Japan’s 
equity prices, (Bootstrap mean estimates with 90 percent confidence bounds) 
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Philippines 
    
    
Singapore 
 
 
  
    
Thailand 
    
Note: Figures are median structural generalized impulse responses to one positive standard deviation shock 
in Japan’s equity prices, identified by sign restrictions, with the corresponding 90th percent confidence 
bounds. The impact is in percentage and the horizon is monthly. 
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 Counterfactual Analysis 
We conduct counterfactual analysis to assess the spillovers of Japanese QQE on Asia. The 
purpose of this exercise is to visualize the growth path of our variables had QQE not been 
implemented. In other words, given that our data sample spans from the year 2000 up to 2016, 
the impulse response results may be capturing fluctuations not relevant to QQE. To that extent, 
the counterfactual analysis allows us to look at the period of the launch of UMP. We forecast 
our variables based on the condition that Japan’s equity prices would have remained the same. 
We also experiment with keeping the shadow interest rate constant.  When we compare our 
forecasts to the original data, we can evaluate the magnitude of the spillovers from Japan’s 
QQE. The conditional forecasts rely on the GVAR’s one-step-ahead projections: Equation 8 
from Chapter 1 shows that the endogenous variable x is equal to the summed lag of the 
domestic and foreign variables and residuals. Therefore, we can conduct our counterfactual 
analysis from time t, to estimate a future value of x, on the estimate that equity prices had 
remained constant.  
 
We choose to report the results of the counterfactual analysis on the ASEAN countries and 
China and Korea only, on output, the exchange rate and equity prices because these variables 
were the most affected by a standard deviation shock to Japan’s equity prices. As for Japan, 
we include the counterfactual analysis on inflation. 
 
Figure 2.5 presents the results of our counterfactual analysis on Japan if equity prices had not 
changed since the first quarter of 2013. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that Japan’s QQE 
had a significant impact on equity prices, the exchange rate and GDP. For Japan, inflation was 
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also significantly affected by the increase in equity prices. Results show that had it not been 
for the growth in equity prices, Japan would not have experienced a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, nor an increase in inflation. Output was also positively affected. 
Figure 2.5: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on Japan: 
 
  
  
  
 
Figures 2.6-2.12 report the results of our counterfactual analysis, keeping equity prices 
constant from 2013M1 20F2121F22.  We see that for some countries, output is higher than it would have 
been without the quantitative easing. Moreover, most countries record equity prices higher 
than the forecasted equity prices. Finally, the counterfactual analysis reveals a currency 
                                                 
21 We also ran different scenarios as robustness checks, such as keeping the monetary base constant from 
2103M1, 2013M2, and keeping equity prices constant in 2013M2 as well. Then, we also tested to see if results 
are homogeneous with the monetary base and equity prices kept constant simultaneously for 2013M1 and 
2013M2. Results are strongly robust.  
22 While Abenomics’ QQE was effectively launched in April 2013, it started having an impact on expectations 
in the first quarter of the year. 
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appreciation in the region for many countries, that also would have been lower if equity prices 
had remained low. It is worth noting that for countries that experience currency appreciation, 
output is lower than the forecasted values, while other countries where the appreciation is not 
so pronounced, output is not so affected. 
Of course, it is important to keep in mind that the actual values reflected in these graphs were 
also subject to other shocks, such as the June 2013 “taper tantrum” as well the decline in oil 
prices (which can be seen by the distinctive dip in equity prices in 2013M06 for most countries). 
These external shocks can also be responsible for the decline in output and equity prices. 
Nonetheless, the results indicate that spillovers from Japan’s QQE were present in some 
ASEAN economies, and could have possibly reduced the impact of the “taper tantrum” and 
price shocks in the region. 
 
Figure 2.6: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on China: 
   
GDP Equity prices Exchange Rate 
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Figure 2.7: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on Korea: 
   
GDP Equity prices Exchange Rate 
 
Figure 2.8: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on Indonesia: 
   
GDP Equity prices Exchange Rate 
 
Figure 2.9: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on Malaysia: 
   
GDP Equity prices Exchange Rate 
 
Figure 2.10: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on the Philippines: 
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Figure 2.11: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on Singapore: 
   
GDP Equity prices Exchange Rate 
 
Figure 2.12: Counterfactual Analysis of QQE on Thailand: 
   
GDP Equity prices Exchange Rate 
 
 
 Conclusion 
This research has analyzed spillovers from Japan’s Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) 
on emerging Asia. We employed the Global VAR model, which captures the financial and 
economic relations of economies across trade and financial channels. We combined financial 
and trade channels to build weights to link the countries together and we explored spillovers 
through the bilateral trade channel and the foreign direct investment channel.  
 
Countries included in our sample in addition to Japan were China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. We also included the U.S., the Euro area and advanced 
European countries, because of the importance of their trade and financial links to Japan, and 
their dominant role in the world economy. Given that Japan’s interest rates have been close 
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to zero for long time, we chose to proxy QQE through a monetary policy-induced increase in 
equity prices, and through a decrease in the shadow interest rate. Shocks to Japan’s equity 
prices were identified by using sign-restrictions on structural impulse responses, while the 
shock to Japan’s shadow interest rate was solved through a recursive Cholesky scheme.  
Our analysis points to two conclusions. First, estimating the model by proxying QQE with 
changes in the shadow interest rate (rather than with an increase in equity prices) does not yield 
strong nor significant spillovers, suggesting that QQE affected other countries in Asia mostly 
through spillovers through the stock market channel. Results suggest that spillovers from 
financial linkages between stock markets, captured by the equity price variable, were larger 
than through balance sheet adjustments, which might have been captured by movements in the 
interest rate.  
The second, and in our view, main result is that spillovers from QQE to emerging Asian 
countries tended to be positive. Despite an appreciation of domestic currencies vis-à-vis the 
yen, the impact on emerging Asia GDP was positive and significant. This suggests that the 
positive effect of QQE on expectations of future wealth through higher stock prices, by 
improving investor confidence, has more than offset any negative exchange rate spillover due 
to expenditure switching from domestic to Japanese goods. Emerging Asia also experienced 
limited spillovers in terms of higher inflation and, on average, increased capital inflows.   
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 Appendix 
Table A2.1: Chapter 2, Trade and Weights Matrix, Averaged over 2012-2014 
 
Notes: Trade weights are calculated as shares of the sum of exports and imports, and should be read vertically. 
(Each column should sum up to 1, however, some countries have been removed from the weights matrix for space 
allocation). Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF. 
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Australia 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Brazil 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Canada 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.15 
Chile 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
China 0.31 0.25 0.09 0.27 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.31 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.19 
Euro 0.09 0.24 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.17 0.56 0.52 0.10 0.42 0.50 0.17 
India 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Indonesia 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Japan 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.08 
Korea 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Malaysia 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Mexico 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12 
New Zealand 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Norway 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Philippines 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Singapore 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Switzerland 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 
Thailand 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Turkey 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 
UK 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 
USA 0.09 0.19 0.69 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.48 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.00 
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Table A2.2: Chapter 2, F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specific Foreign 
Variables, Oil Prices, and the Price of Metals  
 
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 Y* Dp* Eq* Ex* R* Bc* Cf* Poil* Pmetal* 
Australia F(3,169) 2.66 0.36 0.53 0.78  0.20 0.90 2.10 0.81 0.76 
Brazil F(3,168) 2.66 0.22 2.08 0.57  3.63 2.10 0.39 1.80 0.81 
Canada F(2,179) 3.05 0.84 1.20 1.04  0.43 1.44 0.58 0.57 1.66 
Chile F(2,170) 3.05 1.08 3.14 2.51  0.07 0.20 1.28 1.60 0.15 
China F(5,175) 2.27 3.12* 6.08* 2.20  2.10 0.33 1.45 1.67  
Euro F(2,169) 3.05 1.04 0.35 0.48  4.76* 0.26 0.63 0.76 1.58 
India F(1,171) 3.90 2.13 2.32 1.38  0.22 1.63 1.36 0.67 4.45* 
Indonesia F(4,167) 2.43 1.68 0.67 1.18  1.03 1.98 1.90 1.86 0.60 
Japan F(4,167) 2.43 1.42 7.14* 0.16  0.86 0.32 0.50 1.82 3.04* 
Korea F(5,166) 2.27 0.45 4.78* 0.48  1.53 2.38* 0.35 0.92 0.65 
Malaysia F(3,177) 2.66 0.17 1.57 0.40  2.27 1.93 0.24 1.22 0.55 
Mexico F(3,168) 2.66 0.87 0.05 0.87  3.44* 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.80 
New Zealand F(2,171) 3.05 1.23 1.30 0.30  1.14 0.21 1.98 0.87 0.56 
Norway F(2,178) 3.05 0.33 0.19 0.59  1.84 2.27 0.66 0.28 0.18 
Philippines F(4,167) 2.43 1.37 0.48 0.46  0.09 0.87 0.65 0.96 0.62 
Singapore F(2,179) 3.05 0.06 4.50* 1.13  0.50 2.27 0.95 0.46 0.46 
Sweden F(3,177) 2.66 1.97 5.31* 1.53  1.38 0.14 0.81 1.75 0.51 
Switzerland F(3,178) 2.66 3.25* 13.16* 0.14  1.43 0.21 0.31 0.83 0.39 
Thailand F(2,178) 3.05 0.19 4.19* 3.91  2.30 0.53 2.71 2.85 0.03 
Turkey F(3,168) 2.66 0.29 2.59 0.70  1.78 0.10 0.28 0.82 0.70 
United Kingdom F(2,178) 3.05 0.81 5.63* 0.91  0.33 1.08 0.93 0.46 1.68 
United States F(2,180) 3.05 0.03     3.89         2.13 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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 CHAPTER 3. EXPLORING THE IMPACT FROM CHINA’S TRANSITION 
TO A CONSUMPTION-DRIVEN MODEL 
 
 
 Introduction 
During the decade of 2000-2014, China grew at the pace of almost 10 percent GDP per year. 
Its remarkable investment growth bolstered trade and boosted commodity prices, and its global 
share of GDP rose to about 13 percent in 2015. However, as investment grew exponentially 
higher, it dragged down efficiency, 
created overcapacity, contributed to 
the rise of inequality, and led to the 
degradation of environment quality. 
Thus, China started moving from an 
investment-driven economy to a 
consumption-driven one. In 2015, 
consumption growth exceeded 
investment growth (Figure 3.1).   
 
 
This was not without consequences for the rest of the world, due to the strong linkages with 
China. Trade growth made China a main source of exports demand for more than 80 percent 
of world GDP. As GDP dropped to below 7 percent in 2016, trade slowed by 7-8 percent, and 
financial volatility increased. Negative spillovers extended to commodity exporters who had 
Figure 3.1: Consumption and Investment Growth in China 
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previously benefited from the high demand for commodities (namely metals) for infrastructure 
investment. In this context, as China’s investment growth slowed and import demand for 
commodities subsequently declined, this created strong downward pressures on commodity 
prices. The slowdown in investment and increase in market uncertainty also triggered capital 
outflows and relocation of investment.   
 
Our main interest is to study how China’s transitioning may affect investment and consumption 
in other parts of the world. For that purpose, we build a multi-country dataset and set up a 
GVAR model approach,22 F23, which allows for the examination of the propagation of shocks from 
systemic countries to the rest of the world. In addition, through the model, we can examine the 
indirect effects of a shock, through secondary and tertiary channels. The methodology involves 
setting up country-specific individual VARs, and then linking them through the inclusion of 
foreign variables. The latter are weighted averages of the other countries’ variables, and they 
augment the individual country-specific VARs to capture the propagation of shocks. The 
weights on which the foreign variables are built are the countries’ financial and trade exposures 
regarding the other countries.  
 
Given the systemic importance of China, its slowdown and rebalancing have been widely 
researched, with the GVAR model a popular tool of study. The IMF World Economic Outlook 
(2016) considers the effects of China’s transition on global growth using a panel VAR model. 
Cashin, Mohaddes, and Raissi (2016) test China-induced financial volatility in the global 
market using a GVAR model. Dzioli and al (2016) also employ a GVAR model to look at the 
                                                 
23 Pesaran and Smith (2004)  
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spillovers from China to the ASEAN 5 economies. Kireyev and Leonidov (2016) look at 
international spillovers from a decline in China’s imports. However, these studies focus on 
GDP-to-GDP spillovers from China. Our contribution to the literature is by using a novel 
dataset to model the rebalancing of China. Specifically, the main contribution of the research 
is to use country-specific investment and consumption data instead of real GDP data to look at 
the rebalancing effects of China on each country, and draw corresponding policy implications. 
China’s switch from an investment driven model to a consumption-driven one is modeled as a 
1 percent decline in China’s investment, followed by a 1 percent increase in its consumption. 
We then look at their respective impacts on consumption and investment for all other countries, 
and their net effect in total. We test the propagation of China investment and consumption 
shocks through trade, commodities, and financial linkages. We add to the literature by 
considering: the domestic and international impact of rebalancing to consumption from 
investment, the inter-linkages between different regions and China, and by examining the 
propagation of shocks through different channels. This, to the best of our knowledge, has not 
been yet explored in the literature.  
 
Our results show that China’s decline in investment reduces global investment and commodity 
prices. Specifically, a 1 percent shock to China’s investment decreases global investment by 
0.15 percent in the first year. Global consumption is only marginally reduced.  Its most 
significant impact is on commodity prices: oil prices by 2-3 percent, and the price of metals by 
1-2 percent. However, we find that the impact on the financial market (equity prices, interest 
rates, and exchange rates) is not statistically significant. In addition, we test whether the shift 
into a consumption-based growth model would have positive spillovers on the global economy. 
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The results indicate that an increase in consumption raises global investment by 0.12 percent 
and global consumption by a mere 0.05 percent, thus offsetting some of the decline incurred 
by the rebalancing. However, the impact of a positive consumption shock remains largely 
negative on commodity prices, as they continue to decline by 2-3 percent. Therefore, a positive 
consumption shock does not offset the incurred losses on countries that export commodities 
and investment goods.   
 
Region-specific spillovers are overall negative, though heterogeneous in magnitude: we find 
that while growth in China’s consumption would generate positive spillovers for the Asia 
region and offset some of the adverse effects of the decline in investment, other positive 
spillovers are negligible for the rest of the world, and commodity prices would remain 
dampened by low investment. Specifically, Asia Pacific is the only region which mainly gains 
on a net level from China’s transition: in the first year following a 1 percent negative 
investment shock and a 1 percent positive consumption shock, investment increases in total by 
0.17 percent in Southeast Asia and 0.22 percent in Australia and New Zealand, consumption 
increases respectively by 0.12 percent. In Japan, the currency experiences an appreciation 
against the US dollar. Commodity exporting regions like Latin America experience almost a 1 
percent drop in investment upon the China investment shock. Meanwhile, exporters of 
investment goods in the Euro area are also affected by the slowdown in import demand, and 
investment generated by an increase in consumption in China is not enough to offset the decline 
in total investment. Finally, safe-haven currencies like the British Pound and the Swiss Franc 
appreciate against the US dollar.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents the GVAR model, the data 
used and the model specifications. Section III presents empirical results from a reduction in 
China’s investment and an increase of consumption. Section IV concludes. 
  
 A Proxy for the Rebalancing of China 
 Data  
The original GVAR model written by Dees and Al (2004) 23F 24  included the following six 
domestic variables: Real GDP, CPI inflation, the exchange rate , equity prices , short-term 
interest rates , and long-term interest rates. 
However, to study directly the impact of shifting from investment to consumption, we choose 
to replace the real GDP series by two sub-series: Investment and total consumption.  
Investment consists of the gross capital formation in each country, while total consumption is 
the sum of public and private consumption. For countries where quarterly data is not available, 
we interpolate investment using the Chow-Lin interpolation method, based on high-frequency 
indicators. Investment is interpolated based on the corresponding country’s industrial or 
manufacturing production index, as is conventional in the literature. As for consumption, it is 
interpolated based on total sales. In case sales data is not available, we base the interpolation 
on total credit to households. The series are then seasonally adjusted. Data for consumption 
and investment are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, while 
high frequency indicators data are obtained from the IMF IFS, the CEIC, and Haver Analytics.    
                                                 
24 The GVAR toolbox is available for download from https://sites.google.com/site/gvarmodelling/gvar-toolbox.  
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Our dataset thus comprises of quarterly data, from 1979Q1 up to 2015Q4. The following 
country-specific variables are used as domestic variables in the GVAR model: investment 
(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡), consumption  (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡), equity prices (𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡), CPI inflation (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡), the short-term 
interest rate (𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡), and the nominal effective exchange rate (𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡)24F25 25F26. In addition, the price 
of oil per barrel in US dollars (𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙) is included as a global variable, as well as the price of 
metals index (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠)26F27. Data for inflation, exchange rates, short-term interest rates, and for 
the price of oil and price of metals are obtained from the IMF IFS database. As for the equity 
prices data, it is based on the MSCI index, and obtained from Bloomberg. We construct the 
domestic variables as follows:  
Investment: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = ln
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Consumption: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ln
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Inflation: 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) 
Equity prices: 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 = ln(
𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
) 
The exchange rate: 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
The short − term interest rate: 𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  0.25 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠 /100) 
As for the global variables, they are also used in log terms:  
Price of oil: 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙 = ln(𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙) 
Price of Metals: 𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠 = ln(𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠) 
                                                 
25 Further details are provided in the Data appendix on the data.  
26 We opt to omit the long-term interest rates series as it is not publicly available for many countries, and it is 
recommended to include only six domestic variables for each country vector for the GVAR to remain stable. 
27 The metal price index (base year 2005=100) includes copper, aluminum, iron ore, tin, nickel, zinc, lead, and 
uranium price indices.  
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 Model Specification and VARX Setup 
Our model includes 34 countries, each of which are listed in Table 3.1. As consistent with 
GVAR literature, we group 8 of the European countries that joined the Euro area in 1999 into 
a Euro block. The following countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Spain. The Euro block time-series data is then constructed as weighted 
averages of the country-specific time-series data, using the Purchasing Power Parity GDP 
weights, averaged for the years 2009-2011.  
Table 3.1. Countries and Regions Included in the GVAR Model 
     
Asia and Pacific  North America  Europe 
Australia  Canada  Austria 
China  Mexico  Belgium 
India  United States  Finland 
Indonesia    France 
Japan  South America  Germany 
Korea  Argentina  Italy 
Malaysia  Brazil  Netherlands 
New Zealand  Chile  Norway 
Philippines  Ecuador  Spain 
Singapore  Peru  Sweden 
Thailand  Venezuela  Switzerland 
    Turkey 
  Africa  United Kingdom 
  South Africa   
     
Note: The countries in Italics are included in the Euro area block. 
 
 
Except for the United States model, all other countries’ VARX* are built as such:  
Each country-specific model includes the following country-specific 6 domestic (endogenous) 
variables: Investment (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡) , consumption (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡)  CPI inflation (𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡) , equity prices 
(𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡), the exchange rate ( 𝑒𝑖𝑡), and short-term interest rates ( 𝑟𝑖𝑡). Using the desired bilateral 
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flows channel (please see next section), the following 6 foreign (weakly exogenous) variables 
are constructed and included in each country VARX*: 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗    𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , and  𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ . The 
foreign exchange rate variable 𝑒𝑖𝑡
∗  is not included.  
We follow the literature and set up the model as following: the US country model is set up to 
reflect the dominance of the US economy on the rest of the world. The US VARX* vector 
includes all the domestic variables except for the exchange rate. As for the foreign variables, 
only 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗  and  𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  are included. Finally, the price of oil variable enters the US 
VARX* as an endogenous variable, given that the US is the single largest consumer of oil and 
subsequently impacts world oil demand and prices. On the other hand, China accounts for 40 
percent of global metals demand. We therefore can make the assumption that the price of 
metals global variable is endogenous to China, and that we can include it as a domestic variable 
in the China vector model.  
 
 Dynamic Analysis 
Our GVAR model thus counts 26 country-specific VARX* models and 1 region-specific 
VARX* model. As previously explained, each VARX* model includes domestic variables 𝑝𝑖 
and foreign variables  𝑞𝑖. The lag orders for the domestic and foreign variables are determined 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Consistent with GVAR literature, we set the 
maximum lag orders to  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 and  𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1.  The number of cointegrating relations is 
next determined for each country VARX*, and the rank orders obtained using Johansen’s trace 
statistics. The estimated VARX* orders and their corresponding ranks are reported in Table 
3.2.  
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To orthogonalize the impulse response shocks, we employ structural impulse responses 
through a Cholesky factorization scheme. We choose one possible identification scheme by 
adopting the following ordering for the variables in the China bloc: price of metals, short-term 
interest rate, the exchange rate, inflation, investment, and consumption. We experiment with 
other variable orderings and find the results largely robust.  
 
Table 3.2 Lag Orders of the Country-Specific VARX*(p,q) Models Together with the Number 
of Cointegrating Relations (r) 
Country VARX* Order  
𝑝𝑖             𝑞𝑖 
Cointegrating 
Relations (𝑟𝑖) 
Country VARX* Order  
𝑝𝑖             𝑞𝑖 
Cointegrating 
Relations (𝑟𝑖) 
      
Argentina 2 1 2 New Zealand 2 1 2 
Australia 2 1 2 Norway 2 1 3 
Brazil 2 1 4 Peru 2 1 3 
Canada 2 1 2 Philippines 2 1 4 
Chile 2 1 3 Singapore 1 1 3 
China 2 1 2 South Africa 2 1 2 
Ecuador 2 1 2 Sweden 2 1 4 
Euro 2 1 4 Switzerland 2 1 3 
India 2 1 1 Thailand 2 1 4 
Indonesia 2 1 4 Turkey 2 1 2 
Japan 2 1 4 
United 
Kingdom 
1 1 3 
Korea 2 1 3 United States 2 1 3 
Malaysia 2 1 2 Venezuela 2 1 4 
Mexico 2 1 2     
        
Note: 𝑝𝑖  and 𝑞𝑖  refer to the lag order of the domestic and foreign variables respectively and are 
determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The number of cointegrating relations (𝑟𝑖) 
are determined using the trace statistic based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991) for all 
countries. Source: Author’s estimations based on GVAR calculations 
 
 
We also test the robustness of our results by using two bilateral flows channel. The first channel 
is the traditional trade channel, constructed as the sum of imports and exports between each 
country. The second channel is the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) channel, and the weights 
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are constructed based on direct investment inflows and outflows, procured from the IMF’s 
Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). Figure 3.2 reports the average investment 
elasticities over the first year following a negative investment shock to China.  
 
Figure 3.2 Response of Global Investment to a Negative China Investment Shock, Four 
Quarters Cumulative (Using Different Weights)  
 
Note: The graph above depicts the percent change in investment following a 1 percent negative 
investment to China, cumulated over four quarters (1 year).  
 
 
The results show that the magnitude and impact of the shock to China’s investment are similar 
whichever through both channels. Trade shocks are predictably stronger than FDI shocks, 
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given the importance of China in the global trade chain. We thus opt to use the trade flows 
channel to report our remaining results. 
 
 Negative Shock to Investment 
China’s switch in growth models starts with a decline in investment, and a shift towards 
consumption. We first examine the impact of a negative China investment shock on real and 
financial variables, and commodity prices. Figure 3.3 depicts the structural generalized 
impulse responses to a percent negative reduction in China’s investment.  
 
Figure 3.3. Implications of a Negative China Investment Shock for the Global Economy 
Global Investment Global Consumption Price of Oil 
   
   
Price of metal Global Equity Prices Short-term interest rates 
   
Note: Figures are median structural generalized impulse responses to one standard deviation reduction 
in China’s investment, together with the corresponding 90th percent confidence bounds. The impact is 
in percentage and the horizon is quarterly. The “global” economy VAR is constructed through the 
GVAR, using GDP-PPP weights. 
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Results suggest that global investment would drop by about 0.2 percent in the first quarter, 
leading up to 0.5 percent aggregate decline in global growth in the first year. Global 
consumption also declines, though minimally. In addition, China’s shock is transmitted to 
commodity prices, where the price of oil declines by 2 percent in the first quarter, leading up 
to 3 percent by the second year. On the other hand, metal prices drop by 1 percent in the first 
quarter, and cumulate to 2 percent the following year. We can also note that the impact on 
financial markets is limited, with global equity prices dropping by a minor 0.5 percent the first 
quarter before rebounding (and the drop is not statistically significant). Short-term interest rates 
as well are not affected.  
 
Moving on to regional spillovers, we look at the impact of the negative investment shock from 
China to Asia, Europe and the Americas. 27 F 28 Figure 3.4 reports the impact of one negative 
percent shock to China’s investment on selected regions. We find that Southeast Asia is not as 
negatively affected as the rest of the world, indicating that the region is indeed offset by the 
relocation of capital flows and investment28F29. The relocation of capital and investment following 
the rebalancing of China offsets Japan and Singapore’s losses, and increases investment in 
Korea and Thailand. We also see currency appreciation for safe-haven currencies, like the 
Japanese Yen, the Korean Won, and the Singaporean dollar (see figure 3.5). Investment 
declines for commodity exporters in the region, like Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia, while 
                                                 
28 The “Southeast Asia” bloc includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
The “Latin America” bloc includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The “Rest 
of the World” bloc groups Canada, India, and South Africa. Finally, the “Rest of Europe” bloc includes 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.   
29 Capital flows data up to 1979 is not available, and therefore we could not look directly at the relocation of 
capital flows in Southeast Asia.  
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the Philippines also registers losses, as it mainly exports investment goods. However, New 
Zealand, an exporter of consumption goods, slightly benefits from the shift towards 
consumption.  On an aggregate level, we see that the drop is almost zero in total in the first 
year for Asia Pacific. In addition, while not reported here, following the second year after the 
shock, the impulse response results show investment rebounds in many countries. This may be 
in line with predictions that as China moves up the global-value-chain into production of 
intermediate goods, labor-intensive production and investment would relocate to Southeast 
Asia.  
 
Turning to North and Latin America, we see that the impact through commodities prices 
dominates. For instance, investment in the United States drops by 0.1 percent following the 1 
percent negative China investment shock, while it declines by 0.2 percent for Canada.  This 
drop should largely be due to the decrease in oil prices. As for Latin America, we note that the 
region is the most affected by the decline in investment. Given that countries in Latin America 
trade primarily with China and export both metals and oil, they become twice affected: once 
by the fall in commodity prices, and once by the decline in trade. 
 
Spillovers also extend to the Europe, where investment in the Euro area declines by 0.5 percent, 
versus a 0.2 percent investment decline in the United Kingdom, amounting to a total 1 percent 
decline of investment in the rest of Europe by the second year following the shock. The decline 
in investment in the Euro area can be attributed to the decrease in demand for investment goods. 
Finally, countries in the rest of Europe like Norway register a decline in investment due to the 
decline in oil prices and demand for commodities.   
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Figure 3.4. Implications of a Negative China Investment Shock on Regional Investment 
a- Asia Pacific 
 
 
b- Latin and North America 
 
 
c- Europe and South Africa 
 
Note: Graphs show the impulse response results to a one percent reduction in China’s investment 
cumulated over four quarters (one year), together with the corresponding 90th percent confidence 
bounds. The impact is interpreted in percentage. 
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In addition to the impact on investment, financial markets are affected following China’s 
rebalancing. Figure 3.5 reports the impact of the negative China investment shock on both 
equity prices and exchange rates. 
 
Figure 3.5. Implications on Equity Prices and Exchange Rates Following a One Percent 
Negative China Investment Shock (Cumulative Over Four Quarters) 
a. Implications on Equity Prices b. Implications on Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rates 
  
Notes: Graph shows impulse response results to a one percent negative China Investment structural 
shock, with the corresponding 90th percent confidence bounds. The results are cumulated over four 
quarters (one year) and the impact is in percentage. 29F30 
 
 
Results show that China’s nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) appreciates against the US 
dollar by 0.3 percent in the first year 30F31, against a backdrop of deflation induced by lower 
commodity prices and subsequently lower producer prices.. Looking at Japan, we note that 
China’s decline in investment did contribute to the appreciation of the Japanese NEER by 0.2 
                                                 
 
 
31 The data used is up to 2015Q4, and thus only includes the surprise switch to a floating exchange rate regime 
by China data for the last quarter, starting August 2015. Prior to the rebalancing, China’s exchange rate was 
consistently considered undervalued due to its large current account surplus, creating appreciating pressures.  
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percent in the first year, though the result is not statistically significant. Currency appreciation 
is also registered in the United Kingdom, another haven currency, as well as Singapore, Korea, 
and Thailand. In Southeast Asia, despite currency appreciation in Singapore, Korea and 
Thailand, the overall effect is negative on the country-specific exchange rates, particularly on 
Indonesia (an oil exporter). Again, in the “Rest of Europe” bloc, results are overall negative 
due to the depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate in Norway, another oil exporter.  
As for equity prices, we note that while there is change is stock markets, this change is not 
statistically significant to almost all countries (and regions). Japan again benefits with a slight 
increase in equity prices, while stock markets worldwide are negatively affected. The decrease 
in equity prices is likely to be due to an increase in financial volatility and instability after the 
beginning of China’s transition and the subsequent capital flight. However, the impact on 
financial markets remains not statistically significant, which further proves that China’s 
spillovers mainly transmit through the trade channel and commodity prices.  
 
 Positive Shock to Consumption 
We then look at the implications of China’s shift to a consumption demand-driven economy. 
Results seem to suggest that while this growth strategy switch may slow down global growth 
in the short-run, spillovers from consumption shocks are less systemic. Figure 3.6 reports the 
results to one positive percent structural shock to China’s consumption on the global economy. 
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Figure 3.6. Implications of One Positive China Consumption Shock for the Global Economy 
Global Investment Global Consumption Price of Oil 
   
Price of metal Global Equity Prices Short-term interest rates 
   
Note: Figures are median structural generalized impulse responses to one positive standard deviation 
shock in China’s consumption, with the corresponding 90th percent confidence bounds. The impact is 
in percentage and the horizon is quarterly. The “global” economy VAR is constructed through the 
GVAR, using GDP-PPP weights. 
 
 
Looking at Figure 3.7, we can see that a consumption-driven shock has a limited impact on 
global consumption, global investment, and global financial markets. Moreover, though the 
impulse response graphs report a decline in oil and metals prices, this decline is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Turning to regional spillovers, we again note that positive spillovers are registered in Asia, but 
are minimal for the rest of the world. A 1 percent positive consumption shock in China 
increases consumption in Japan by 0.12 percent in the first year, versus a 0.3 percent increase 
in Korea. Given that both countries are exporters of industrial goods and electronics, and key 
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trade partners to China, the increase in consumption could induced by higher sales and gains 
from the increase in China’s consumption demand. Consumption also increases by 0.1 percent 
in Australia, who is an exporter of animal and vegetables products. Overall, except for the 
Philippines, consumption in Asia Pacific increases, by about 0.1 percent. However, the 
remaining regions in the world are not particularly affected by the positive consumption shock, 
as the results for Latin America, North America, and Europe show that the impulse responses 
are not statistically significant.  
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Figure 3.7. Implications of a Positive China Consumption Shock on Regional Consumption. 
a- Asia Pacific 
 
 
b- Latin and North America 
 
 
c- Europe and South Africa 
 
 Note: Graphs show the impulse response results to a one percent increase in China’s consumption 
cumulated over four quarters (one year), together with the corresponding 90th percent confidence 
bounds. The impact is interpreted in percentage. 
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 Net Effects of the Transition to a Consumption-Driven Economy 
The rebalancing of China has been described as the decrease in investment, while consumption 
increases simultaneously for the economy to transition into a consumption-driven growth 
model. To proxy the rebalancing effect on the rest of the world, we aggregate the results of the 
effects of a decline in investment and the increase in consumption, on both regional investment 
and consumption after having normalized both shocks to 1 percent shocks.  Figure 3.8 reports 
the net effect on investment and consumption following China’s rebalancing. We can see again 
that Asia Pacific is mostly gaining from China’s transition: Investment increases in Southeast 
Asia in total by 0.17 percent, while consumption increases by 0.12 percent. Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand also register increases in both investment and consumption in total. 
Meanwhile, for commodity exporters in Latin America and the rest of the world, the positive 
consumption shock is not enough to offset both the decline in investment and consumption 
following the negative investment shock. And while the impact on the Euro area’s 
consumption sums up to zero after consumption and investment shocks, investment will still 
decline given that many countries in the Euro Area export investment goods. On an aggregate 
level, results show that global investment will decline by 0.01 percent, while consumption 
increases by 0.03 percent, which means that increase in consumption could possibly offset the 
decline in investment in the long-run.  
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Figure 3.8. Net effects of China’s Rebalancing on Regional Consumption and Investment 
 
a. Implications on Regional Investment b.  b. Implications on Regional Consumption 
 
 
 
Note: Graph shows impulse response combined results of a 1 percent negative China Investment 
structural shock, and a 1 percent positive China consumption structural shock. The results are 
cumulated over four quarters (one year) and the impact is in percentage.  
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 Conclusion 
This research sets up a GVAR model for 34 countries (8 of which are included in the Euro 
region) over the period 1979Q1-2015Q4 using country-specific consumption and investment 
data instead of GDP data to analyze the impact of the rebalancing of China on the world. The 
model estimates the rebalancing of China by calculating the effect of a 1 percent decline in 
China’s investment, followed by a 1 percent increase in China’s consumption. As a robustness 
check, we use different bilateral flows channels and note that the results are generally 
homogeneous.  
  
Our results draw the following conclusions: A 1 percent decline of China’s investment reduces 
global investment by 0.15-0.2, global consumption by 0.03 percent, and pushes down 
commodity prices by 2 to 3 percent.  Results show that the rebalancing itself  has  a more 
limited impact on financial markets, and that shocks transmit through the trade channel and 
commodity prices. In addition, regional spillovers indicate that while the rest of the world is 
negatively affected by the decline in investment and commodity prices, Asia and the Pacific  
rather  benefit from the rebalancing, through appreciation of safe haven currencies, relocation 
of labor-intensive investment to Southeast Asia, and an increase in demand for consumption 
goods.  
 
Our calculations also show that a 1 percent increase its consumption will raise in the first year 
global investment by 0.1-0.2 percent, and global consumption by around 0.05 percent, thus 
offsetting a part of the negative impact of China’s transition from investment towards 
consumption. However, the impact of the rebalancing is still borne on commodity exporters 
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and producers of investments goods, for whom the positive impact of the consumption increase 
does not offset the decline in investment. Declines may also have been driven by uncertainty, 
capital outflows, and an increase in volatility in financial markets.  
 In terms of policy implications, countries which are commodity exporters and exporters of 
investment goods could offset some of the negative impact of the rebalancing by diversifying 
their exports bases. They could further benefit from China’s increased consumption demand 
by switching towards more production of consumption goods. Additionally, more countries in 
Southeast Asia should shift towards the labor-intensive production of goods to reduce negative 
spillovers, and to take advantage of production space left by China as it moves up the global 
value chain.  
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 Appendix 
 
Table A3.1: F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specific Foreign Variables, 
with Investment, Oil Prices, and the Price of Metal  
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
  
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 Inv* Dp* Eq* Ex* R* Poil* Pmetal* 
Argentina F(1,122) 3.92 1.09 9.27* 0.05  14.77* 2.47 5.31* 
Australia F(2,131) 3.07 1.80 0.43 0.37  1.01 0.47 0.93 
Brazil F(2,121) 3.07 0.36 0.97 0.38  0.87 0.11 0.27 
Canada F(2,131) 3.07 0.78 1.50 2.01  0.31 1.43 0.83 
Chile F(2,131) 3.07 3.12 0.66 2.34  0.52 0.21 2.50 
China F(2,121) 3.07 0.23 0.15 1.12  0.80 1.13   
Ecuador F(2,125) 3.07 1.06 2.67 0.48  1.04 0.28 1.03 
Euro F(3,130) 2.67 2.41 2.28 1.05  1.24 0.57 1.45 
India F(1,132) 3.91 0.07 0.76 3.51  0.51 1.31 0.63 
Indonesia F(2,132) 3.06 2.63 0.73 0.31  0.47 0.14 0.02 
Japan F(2,131) 3.07 2.58 1.04 0.18  0.96 0.07 0.65 
Korea F(3,130) 2.67 1.26 0.33 0.47  0.21 0.47 0.04 
Malaysia F(1,120) 3.92 1.37 0.26 0.29  1.09 0.00 0.39 
Mexico F(2,132) 3.06 0.93 0.08 0.37  0.17 0.16 0.90 
New Zealand F(2,131) 3.07 1.66 4.24* 0.63  6.59* 3.67* 0.21 
Norway F(2,132) 3.06 1.04 1.96 0.25  3.31* 3.90* 1.57 
Peru F(3,120) 2.68 3.51* 1.46 0.72  1.63 2.35 0.51 
Philippines F(3,130) 2.67 0.53 0.07 1.16  0.39 0.88 1.54 
Singapore F(3,123) 2.68 0.61 1.33 2.30  0.66 1.83 0.40 
South Africa F(3,123) 2.68 0.94 1.04 2.06  1.09 2.36 0.94 
Sweden F(3,130) 2.67 2.06 0.93 0.66  0.96 0.18 0.60 
Switzerland F(2,124) 3.07 0.23 1.07 0.40  0.10 0.26 0.15 
Thailand F(3,123) 2.68 0.35 1.08 1.03  0.85 1.78 0.13 
Turkey F(1,126) 3.92 0.01 0.29 0.03  0.22 1.36 0.02 
United Kingdom F(2,131) 3.07 1.02 0.26 4.18*  2.00 0.24 0.22 
United States F(2,134) 3.06 0.36   2.62   3.39* 
Venezuela F(1,122) 3.92 2.01 1.94 0.01   3.98 0.22 0.00 
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Table A3.1: F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specific Foreign Variables, 
with Consumption, Oil Prices, and the Price of Metal  
 
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 Cons* Dp* Eq* Ex* R* Poil* Pmetal* 
Argentina F(1,122) 3.92 0.94 7.58* 0.00  12.34* 2.08 4.23 
Australia F(1,132) 3.91 1.59 0.03 0.16  0.40 0.32 0.11 
Brazil F(3,131) 2.67 0.42 9.17* 1.88  0.05 0.33 0.27 
Canada F(2,131) 3.07 0.88 0.13 0.33  0.82 0.20 1.27 
Chile F(3,130) 2.67 2.09 3.49* 0.93  1.00 1.32 0.70 
China F(2,121) 3.07 0.73 2.10 0.68  1.17 0.21  
Ecuador F(1,126) 3.92 1.10 1.69 1.75  2.34 0.39 3.34 
Euro F(3,130) 2.67 0.52 0.79 0.31  0.57 0.59 1.17 
India F(1,132) 3.91 0.08 4.17* 2.19  2.16 0.01 0.52 
Indonesia F(3,131) 2.67 1.04 0.85 0.13  3.24 0.46 0.36 
Japan F(3,130) 2.67 1.18 0.42 0.13  0.36 0.02 0.91 
Korea F(3,130) 2.67 0.71 0.22 1.18  1.30 0.67 1.27 
Malaysia F(3,123) 2.68 0.15 0.70 2.91*  0.80 1.11 1.62 
Mexico F(2,132) 3.06 0.10 1.57 1.73  0.73 1.01 0.29 
New Zealand F(2,131) 3.07 1.37 2.00 1.23  3.81* 2.57 1.95 
Norway F(2,132) 3.06 3.66* 4.30* 0.05  0.97 2.52 0.26 
Peru F(3,122) 2.68 0.73 1.10 0.42  2.29 2.56 1.02 
Philippines F(3,130) 2.67 0.70 0.36 0.95  0.52 0.12 0.39 
Singapore F(3,123) 2.68 1.00 0.65 2.77  0.18 1.08 2.07 
South Africa F(3,123) 2.68 0.41 0.24 3.50*  0.64 2.65 3.15* 
Sweden F(2,131) 3.07 0.69 1.75 0.98  0.67 0.80 0.79 
Switzerland F(3,130) 2.67 0.21 0.22 1.46  0.54 1.11 0.04 
Thailand F(2,124) 3.07 0.71 0.99 1.22  0.91 0.02 0.44 
Turkey F(2,132) 3.06 0.08 0.28 0.82  0.15 1.46 0.69 
United Kingdom F(1,132) 3.91 0.49 0.03 4.20*  4.68* 1.00 0.00 
United States F(2,134) 3.06 0.73   1.31   1.15 
Venezuela F(3,120) 2.68 2.35 1.66 0.58  2.34 0.23 1.68 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
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 CHAPTER 4. SPILLOVERS FROM CHINA TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 31F32 
 
 
 Introduction 
The literature related to the rebalancing of China has largely focused on its impact on advanced 
economies and selected emerging markets. Lower commodity prices and a decline in global 
growth are two of the various channels through which countries could be affected by the 
transition of China: the IMF’s April 2016 Regional Economic Outlook reported that the G20’s 
growth could be reduced by 0.25 percentage points, following a 1 percent decline in China’s 
growth.  
 
However, few studies have addressed the potential impact of China’s transition on countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). One notable exception is Cashin, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012), who compute inward 
and outward spillovers on the MENA region from systemic countries. How are importers and 
exporters of oil in the region impacted by the change in China’s business model? We deem 
this a relevant question, given the macroeconomic importance of the region to the rest of the 
world, and the role it plays in the production and supply of natural resources. We thus employ 
a Global VAR (GVAR) model to estimate the impact of China’s slowdown on the MENA 
region and the rest of the world. Spillovers from macroeconomic shocks are captured for other 
                                                 
32 The contents of this chapter are original to the author of this thesis, and results based on the analytical 
exercises were incorporated in the IMF’s October 2016 Regional Economic Outlook (REO)’s Chapter 4, 
entitled “How Will China’s Rebalancing Affect the Middle East and Central Asia?” (page 37-38).  
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countries through the inclusion of foreign variables, which are weighted averages of other 
countries’ variables. We create different sets of foreign variables, each time according to 
different time periods, to investigate how the linkages between China, the MENA and GCC 
regions have evolved over time. In addition, we look at how those linkages have evolved with 
regards to other systemic countries as well. As such, we compare the impact of the magnitude 
of a China shock to the magnitude of shocks from the Euro Area and the United States.  
 
We contribute to the existing literature in two ways: first, we extend the original dataset by 
Cashin et al (2012)32F33 which assesses the GDP-to-GDP comparison of shocks, to 2014Q4, so 
that it encompasses the global financial crisis. Then, we also create a dataset for the countries 
in our model (notably the MENA and GCC regions), using country-specific consumption and 
investment data. We use that dataset to model the impact of transition of China from an 
investment-driven model to a consumption-driven economy. More specifically, we compute a 
negative investment shock to China’s investment, followed by a positive shock to its 
consumption, and look at the cumulative impact of the shocks on the MENA region. 
 
Our results show, when estimating our GVAR for the two fixed trade weight years 1996-1998 
and 2012-2014, that China’s linkages with the MENA have grown, which results in a larger 
magnitude for the propagation of shocks. The same exercise reveals that the linkages between 
the USA and the MENA, and the Euro Area and the MENA, have shrunk, allowing for the 
impact of the shocks to be of smaller magnitude. However, the results show that a negative 
output shock from the United States is still larger in magnitude than a China shock or a Euro 
                                                 
33 The original dataset by Cashin et al (2012) ends at 2008Q1.  
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shock. We attribute this to the US’ systemic role in the oil market. Finally, the results of the 
rebalancing exercise show that a decrease in investment in China also lowers investment in the 
MENA region through the oil channel, by pushing down oil prices. This could be because a 
decline in investment in China lowers the demand for natural resources, including oil and gas. 
However, an increase in consumption demand slightly offsets the adverse effects from the 
decline in oil prices, especially for oil importers, who benefit from the now-cheaper imports, 
and the increase in China’s import demand for consumption goods. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data used and the 
model specifications. Section 4.3 presents the empirical results of the GDP-to-GDP spillovers 
from China, the US, and the Euro Area to the MENA region. Section 4.4 presents the empirical 
results from China’s rebalancing proxy. Section 4.5 concludes.  
 
 Empirical Estimation 
 Data  
The original dataset used by Dees and al. (2007) includes 33 countries. This chapter extends 
the dataset to include 47 countries, 13 of which are countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. The model thus spans from 1979Q1 to 2014Q4, and comprises of 18 
oil exporting countries, 11 of which are OPEC member countries. Conflict areas like Libya, 
Syria and Iraq are left out of the analysis. Venezuela is also not included in the analysis.     
Two region blocs are created in the estimation of this model. The first is the Euro Area bloc, 
which groups the 8 countries that joined the Euro area in 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
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France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. The second area bloc is for the GCC region, 
and includes the following 6 countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. Grouping the Gulf countries does not go against economic reason: first, 
all said countries have their currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar. In addition, the GCC countries 
have fostered similar policies to further financial and trade integration in the region. The time 
series variables for these regions are constructed as weighted averages of the domestic 
variables, based on the Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights, for the averaged period between 
2012-2014. Table 4.1 lists the countries included in our GVAR model.  
Table 4.1. Countries included in the GVAR model 
MENA oil exporters  Systemic Countries  Other Oil Exporters 
Algeria  China  Canada 
GCC countries:  Euro Area:  Ecuador 
Bahrain  Austria  Indonesia 
Kuwait  Belgium  Mexico 
Oman  Finland  Nigeria 
Qatar  France  Norway 
Saudi Arabia  Germany  Pakistan  
United Arab Emirates (UAE)  Italy   
Iran  Netherlands   
  Spain  Latin America 
  Japan  Argentina 
  United Kingdom  Brazil 
MENA oil importers  United States  Chile 
Egypt    Peru 
Jordan  Emerging Asia   
Morocco  Korea  Rest of the World 
Tunisia  Malaysia  Australia 
Turkey  Philippines  India 
  Singapore  New Zealand 
  Thailand  South Africa 
    Sweden 
    Switzerland 
Note: The countries in Italics are included in region blocs.  
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Meanwhile, we use the following country-specific macro-variables for our analysis 33F34: Real 
GDP (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), equity prices (𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡), CPI inflation (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡), the short-term interest rate (𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡), 
the long-term interest rate (𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡), and the nominal effective exchange rate (𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡)34F35.  
Real GDP series are taken from the IMF IFS, and missing values are filled from the IMF WEO 
estimations database. GDP values which are available only in annual frequency are 
interpolated into quarterly frequency using the Chow-Lin interpolation method, based on 
industrial production indices. Data for CPI inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate are 
also obtained from the IMF IFS. The exchange rate used is the nominal effective exchange rate, 
while equity prices are based on Bloomberg’s MSCI country-specific index. 
Moreover, two global variables are included in our model: The first is the price of oil per barrel 
in US dollars (𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙), obtained from the IMF IFS database, and the second is the total quantity 
of oil in barrels produced world-wide (Q𝑜𝑖𝑙), obtained from the OPEC database.  
The domestic variable series used are then seasonally adjusted using EViews’ Census X13, 
and constructed as such:  
Real GDP: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ln
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Inflation: 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) 
Equity prices: 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 = ln(
𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
) 
The exchange rate: 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
The short − term interest rate: 𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  0.25 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠 /100) 
                                                 
34 The Data appendix offers more detailed information on the variables used. 
35 We opt to omit the long-term interest rates series as it is not publicly available for many countries, and it is 
recommended to include only six domestic variables for each country vector for the GVAR to remain stable. 
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The long − term interest rate: 𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  0.25 ∗ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠 /100) 
As for the global variables, they are also used in log terms:  
Price of oil: 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙 = ln(𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑙) 
Quantity of oil: 𝑄𝑜𝑖𝑙 = ln(𝑄𝑜𝑖𝑙) 
 
 VARX Specification 
Excluding the United States and the GCC models, every other country-specific model is set up 
to include the following respective 6 domestic (endogenous) variables: Real GDP (𝑌𝑖𝑡) , CPI 
inflation (𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡) , equity prices (𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡), the exchange rate ( 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡), and short-term interest rates 
( 𝑟𝑖𝑡), and long-term interest rates ( 𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡). The following 5 foreign (weakly exogenous) variables 
are then constructed and included in each country VARX*: 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  and  𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ . The 
foreign exchange rate variable 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  is not included.  
The US VARX* vector is set up to include all the domestic variables except for the exchange 
rate, but only the following foreign variables are added to the VARX: 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗  and  𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ . 
Finally, the price of oil global variable enters the US VARX* as an endogenous variable, given 
that the United States is the largest consumer of oil in the world, thus accounting for the largest 
share of oil demand and consequently controlling oil prices. This is standard in GVAR 
literature, which sets the US vector to reflect economic dominance.  
Meanwhile, the GCC VARX* bloc is set up as the rest of the other countries, except that the 
domestic interest rate created for the region is not included. In addition, the world quantity of 
oil global variable is included as endogenous in its regional VARX bloc. This is because the 
GCC region controls for a very large portion of oil supply: by 2015, the GCC region accounted 
for 20 percent of world production of oil, and 50 percent of OPEC oil production.  
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The lag orders for the domestic and foreign variables are determined using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Consistent with GVAR literature, we set the maximum lag orders 
to  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 and  𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1.  The number of cointegrating relations is next determined for 
each country VARX*, and the rank orders obtained using Johansen’s trace statistics. The 
estimated VARX* orders and their corresponding ranks are reported in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. Lag Orders of the Country-Specific VARX*(p,q) Models Together with the 
Number of Cointegrating Relations (r) 
Country VARX* 
Order  
𝑝𝑖             𝑞𝑖 
Cointegrating 
Relations (𝑟𝑖) 
Country VARX* 
Order  
𝑝𝑖             𝑞𝑖 
Cointegrating 
Relations (𝑟𝑖) 
      
Algeria 2 1 1 New Zealand 2 1 3 
Argentina 2 1 1 Nigeria 2 1 2 
Australia 1 1 5 Norway 2 1 1 
Brazil 2 1 2 Pakistan 2 1 2 
Canada 2 1 4 Peru 2 1 3 
Chile 2 1 3 Philippines 2 1 3 
China 1 1 2 Singapore 1 1 1 
Ecuador 2 1 2 South Africa 2 1 4 
Egypt 2 1 0 Sweden 2 1 3 
Euro 1 1 3 Switzerland 1 1 3 
GCC 2 1 3 Thailand 2 1 3 
India 1 1 1 Tunisia 2 1 0 
Indonesia 2 1 2 Turkey 2 1 2 
Iran 1 1 1 United 
Kingdom 
2 1 2 
Jordan 2 1 2 United States 2 1 3 
Japan 2 1 3 New Zealand 2 1 3 
Korea 2 1 4 Nigeria 2 1 2 
Malaysia 2 1 1 Norway 2 1 1 
Mexico 1 1 2 Pakistan 2 1 2 
Morocco 2 1 2     
        
Note: 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 refer to the lag order of the domestic and foreign variables respectively and are determined 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), with the maximum lag for order for the domestic variables 
set to 2, and the maximum lag order for foreign variables set to 1. The number of cointegrating relations (𝑟𝑖) 
are determined using the trace statistic based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991) for all 
countries. Source: Author’s estimations  
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 Bilateral Flow Channels 
We expect to see that China’s trade linkages have evolved. This is because during the decade 
of 2000-2014, China’s GDP grew at a pace of nearly 10 percent per year, making it a driver of 
world growth. China’s growth boosted global trade and became the principal source of exports 
demand for 80 percent of world GDP 35F36. The boom in infrastructure in China boosted demand 
for commodities, thus raising commodity prices and inducing positive spillovers to commodity 
exporters. To that extent, we can expect to see that trade linkages between China and the rest 
of the world evolved between 1979 and 2014. Tables 4.3.a and 4.3.b report the trade weights, 
computed by the GVAR model, between the MENA region and systemic countries for the 
periods 1996-1998 and 2012-2014. 
The trade weights show us that the Euro Area was the main trading partner for most countries 
in the MENA region in 1996-1998, and specifically the countries of the Maghreb 36F37 (Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia), and remains as such for 2012-2014. However, much of that trade 
weight has shifted towards China. For instance, China now accounts for 10 percent of Egypt’s 
trade, versus a 3 percent trade weight for the period between 1996 to 1998. Furthermore, the 
trade weights show that most of the countries in the MENA region now trade more with China 
than with the United States. Again, Egypt’s trade weight with the US for the period between 
1996 to 1998 is 19 percent, versus a current weight of 9 percent. Only for Morocco and Jordan 
do we see a higher trade weight for the US than for China. However, this may not necessarily 
                                                 
36 IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2016. 
37 Countries of the Mashreq include Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. Countries of the Maghreb include Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia.  
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mean that larger shocks would be transmitted from China, given the United States’ role in the 
oil market.  
Table 4.3.a MENA Trade weights, 1996-1998 
 a- Averages between 1996-1998 
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China 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Euro 0.60 0.15 0.38 0.00 0.16 0.31 0.27 0.12 0.33 0.37 0.15 0.53 0.45 0.36 0.12 
GCC 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.15 
Iran 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Japan 0.02 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.11 
Pakistan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkey 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
United Kingdom 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 
USA 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.31 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.00 
                
Maghreb 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.09 
Mashreq 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
MENA 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.32 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.24 
                
Other Oil Exporters 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.21 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.29 
Latin America 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 
Emerging Asia 0.02 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Rest of the World 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.36 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.04 
 
Table 4.3.b MENA Trade weights, 2012-2014 
 b- Averages between 2012-2014 
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China 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.29 0.10 0.24 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.14 
Euro 0.49 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.26 0.35 0.08 0.39 0.33 0.38 0.12 
GCC 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.24 0.31 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.32 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 
Iran 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Japan 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Pakistan 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkey 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
United Kingdom 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02 
USA 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.00 
                
Maghreb 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.10 
Mashreq 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
MENA 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.24 0.35 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.37 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.23 
                  
Other Oil Exporters 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.26 
Latin America 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Emerging Asia 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.06 
Rest of the World 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.24 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.05 
Note: the trade weights are computed as shares of the sum of imports and exports by the GVAR model. The trade weights are 
read by column. Not including the MENA region (which accounts for the GCC, Mashreq, and Maghreb weights), the trade 
weights sum to 1.  
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 GDP-to-GDP Spillovers 
In this section, we investigate whether the growing trade linkages between China and the 
MENA have resulted in the weakening of the impact of the Euro Area and the United States 
on the region. We thus compare the magnitude of shocks to the MENA region by computing a 
negative shock to real GDP for the United States, the Euro Area, and China respectively. The 
shocks are carried out using different time weights (1996-1998), and (2012-2014), and through 
the bilateral trade channel. 
 
 Shock to China’s GDP 
Given China’s systemic role in global trade and world growth, one can expect spillovers to 
other regions and commodity prices in case of a shock. A slowdown in China is likely to affect 
the MENA region through the oil channel: a reduction in oil demand will negatively impact 
oil exporters. Secondary effects may be incurred by oil importers, who rely on remittances 
from the MENA oil exporters.  We proxy China’s slowdown by a negative shock to China’s 
output. To estimate orthogonal impulse responses, we identify a shock to real GDP by 
combining sign restrictions with the use of a recursive Cholesky scheme. Dees et al. (2007) 
employed structural impulse responses through a Cholesky factorization schemes for the 
specification of shocks.  
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4.3.1.1 Identification of Shocks  
Following Dees et al. (2007), we adopt the following variable ordering as an identification 
scheme: short-term interest rate, the exchange rate, inflation, and real output. We experiment 
with a few variable orderings and our results are largely robust. We construct the impulse 
response functions following Eickmeyer and Ng (2015)’s approach, which combines the 
structural generalized impulse responses with imposing sign restrictions for the identification 
of shocks.  The sign restrictions imposed are based on economically accepted empirical 
observations. As such, to observe the spillover of the shocks to the MENA region, we impose 
on China’s cointegrating vector the following sign restrictions, to identify the negative impact 
of China’s slowdown on oil prices.  
In fact, there is a growing body of literature which explains that China has a direct impact on 
oil prices, and especially during the 2014-2016 oil price collapse episode. For instance, the 
IMF’s 2016 October World Economic Outlook suggests that China’s slowdown accounts for 
one third of the decline in oil prices. Beirne et al (2013) finds that China’s GDP growth adds 
a premium to the price of oil which increases over time. The World Bank (2018) finds that the 
decline in China’s demand for oil played a role in the decline of oil prices. As such, sign 
restrictions are imposed on China’s cointegrating vector to highlight its impact on the price of 
oil, according to table 4.4.  
 
Table 4.4. Sign Restrictions on China’s Cointegrating Vector 
 
CV1 𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗  Poil Qoil 
Sign restrictions  - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
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Figure 4.1 reports the results of the GVAR model, following a shock to China’s output with 
trade weights computed for 1996-1998, and trade weights computed for 2012-2014. 
 
Figure 4.1. Impulse responses of Output to a 1 Percent Negative Shock to China GDP, Four 
Quarters Cumulated, through the Trade Channel 
 
a- Trade Weights Averaged Over 1996-1998  b- Trade Weights Averaged over 2012-2014 
 
 
 
Note: The columns represent the annual (cumulated over four quarters) impulse response results of 
country-output following a one percent reduction in China’s real GDP, with the bars corresponding to 
the 90th and 10th percent confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage.  
 
 
The results reflect on China’s increased integration with the MENA region. Using the trade 
weights averaged over 1996-1998, the 1% negative shock to China’s output yields a decline in 
the GCC’s output by 0.06% percent, versus a 0.03% decline in Iran’s GDP, a 0.05% decline in 
Jordan and Tunisia’s GDP respectively, and a 0.06% cut in Turkey’s GDP. Figure 4.1.b shows 
that the shock becomes bigger (0.08 percent) and remains statistically significant on a yearly 
horizon for the GCC countries using the 2012-2014 trade weights. Meanwhile, the magnitude 
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of the shock also increases to -0.1 percent for Tunisia, Jordan and Turkey, and -0.06 percent 
to Iran. Moving on other oil exporters, we see that the impact of the shock also grows for them, 
and specially for Ecuador, Indonesia, and Mexico. While the growth in the magnitude of the 
shock can be explained by geographical proximity for Indonesia, it can be attributed to the 
increase in trade integration for the countries in Latin America, whose trade linkages especially 
developed with China after the subprime financial crisis (Cesa-Bianchi et Al, 2011).  
 
 Shock to the USA’s GDP 
The United States has long established its systemic importance on the global economy. The 
extent of its systemic importance was brought to light during the subprime financial crisis, as 
spillovers from the financial system, the slowdown in US growth, and the consequences of 
monetary policies adopted propagated through different channels to the rest of the world. Trade 
linkages between the United States and the MENA region are strong, counting for 23 percent 
of total trade of the MENA region. Though these linkages have declined by 1 percent since 
1996-1998, they remain the strongest linkages for the MENA region in total. In addition, the 
US’ position in the commodity markets is crucial: as the single largest consumer of oil, it has 
an immediate impact on oil prices. Therefore, we can also assume spillovers to oil exporters 
through the oil channel as well.  
Figure 4.2 reports the result of our GVAR estimations for a one percent negative shock to US 
real GDP, using the trade weights averaged over the periods 1996-1998 and 2012-2014.  
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Figure 4.2. Impulse responses of Output to a 1 Percent Negative Shock to US GDP, Four 
Quarters Cumulated, through the Trade Channel 
 
a- Trade Weights Averaged Over 1996-1998  b- Trade Weights Averaged over 2012-2014 
 
 
 
Note: The columns represent the annual (cumulated over four quarters) impulse response results of country-
output following a one percent reduction in US real GDP, with the bars corresponding to the 90th and 10th 
percent confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage. 
 
 
A shock to US GDP has considerably larger consequences on the MENA region and other oil 
exporters, due its heavy reliance on oil exports. Using trade weights averaged 1996-1998, a 1 
percent decline in US GDP yields a decrease in the GCC’s GDP by -0.17 percent, while output 
drops by 0.16 percent in Egypt, and by 0.29 percent in Jordan, 0.26 percent in Morocco, and 
0.39 percent in Turkey. However, results using trade weights averaged over the years 2012-
2014 suggest that, while the magnitude of a US shock remains much larger than that of a China 
shock, it is smaller than that using 1996-1998 trade weights. For instance, Egypt’s GDP drops 
by 0.12 percent following a US shock using the 2012-2014 trade weights, while Morocco’s 
drops by 0.14 percent. Furthermore, Jordan’s GDP declines by 0.21 percent (versus a 0.29 
percent using earlier weights), and Turkey’s output drops by 0.32 percent. 
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Similarly, results indicate that the magnitude of the shock also becomes smaller for other oil 
exporters and systemic economies as you switch trade weights from 1996-1998 to 2012-2014. 
For instance, the magnitude of the shock on output drops from 0.36 percent to 0.34 percent for 
Canada, from -0.21 percent to -0.16 percent for the Euro area, and from -0.40 to -0.36 percent 
for Mexico. 
The magnitude of spillovers from the US shock compared a shock to China (or the Euro Area) 
comes from the impact of the US on oil prices. Figure 4.3 presents the responses of oil prices 
to a shock from US, China, and Euro GDP respectively. We can see that while a Euro shock is 
not statistically significant on oil prices, a one percent negative shock to China’s output will 
push down oil prices by 0.65 percent, while a one percent negative shock to US GDP will 
decrease oil prices by more than 4 percent.  
 
Figure 4.3. Impulse responses of Oil Prices to a 1 Percent Negative Shock to US, China, and 
Euro GDP, Four Quarters Cumulated 
 
 
Note: The columns represent the annual (cumulated over four quarters) impulse response results of oil 
prices following a one percent reduction in US real GDP, China real GDP, and Euro Real GDP, with 
the bars corresponding to the 90th and 10th percent confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage. 
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 Shock to the Euro Area’s GDP 
Trade linkages with Europe remain strong in the MENA region, though they have been 
declining. Indeed, the impact of shocks has also been gradually decreasing. Looking at figure 
4.4.a, one negative percent structural shock to the Euro bloc’s GDP reduced Jordan’s GDP by 
about 0.4 percent during the period 1996-1998, whereas it reduces Jordan’s GDP by 0.2 percent 
during the period 2012-2014.  In addition, while a negative shock to the Euro Area has a 
statistically significant impact on North African countries like Tunisia and Morocco using 
1996-1998 trade weights, results show that it does not affect them in a statistically significant 
manner anymore, as shown by the impulse response results for trade weights 2012-2014. 
Figure 4.4 Impulse responses of Output to a 1 Percent Negative Shock to Euro GDP, Four 
Quarters Cumulated, through the Trade Channel 
 
a- Trade Weights Averaged Over 1996-1998  b- Trade Weights Averaged over 2012-2014 
 
 
 
Note: The columns represent the annual (cumulated over four quarters) impulse response results of 
country-output following a one percent reduction in Euro Area real GDP, with the bars corresponding 
to the 90th and 10th percent confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage. 
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 Impact of China’s Rebalancing on the MENA Region 
 
In this section, we model a proxy for China’s rebalancing from an investment-driven economy 
to a consumption-driven one to study its impact on the MENA region. We use country-specific 
consumption and investment data instead of real GDP data, to model the rebalancing effects 
of China.  
 
 Data and VARX Setup 
For this exercise, we replace real GDP series with two sub-series: investment (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 )and 
consumption (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡). Investment represents the gross capital formation for each country, 
while consumption is the sum of private and public consumption 37F38. Data for consumption and 
investment are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, while 
high frequency indicators data are obtained from the IMF IFS, the CEIC, and Haver Analytics.  
Both variables are computed as such: 
Investment: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = ln
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Consumption: 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 = ln
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
 
                                                 
38  For countries where the data is not available on a quarterly basis, we use the Chow-Lin method to interpolate 
data from an annual frequency to a quarterly frequency. The high-frequency indicator used to interpolate 
investment is the industrial production index of a country. If unavailable, we use the manufacturing production 
index. For the MENA region, the most consistent production index is the manufacturing production index for 
crude oil. Meanwhile, consumption data is interpolated using high-frequency sales data. In the case where sales 
data is also unavailable, we base our interpolations on the credit to the private sector series 
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The five other variables which were used for assessing GDP-to-GDP spillovers are again here 
included: inflation, equity prices, the nominal effective exchange rate, short-term and long-
term interest rates, and the price and world quantity of oil. Since it is recommended to include 
up to 6 domestic variables in the GVAR for the model to remain stable, we split our dataset 
into two sub-datasets. The first one includes investment data (along with the 5 other original 
variables), while the second includes consumption data and the remaining variables. Our 
GVAR datasets our then estimated for the same 47 countries used in section III, for the period 
of 1979Q1 to 2015Q4 38F39.  
The VARX specifications are as follow: for every country other than the US, each country-
specific model will include the following 6 domestic variables: Investment ( 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡)  (or 
consumption (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡)), CPI inflation (𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡) , equity prices (𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡), the exchange rate ( 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡), 
short-term interest rates ( 𝑟𝑖𝑡), and the long-term interest rates ( 𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡).  The following 6 foreign 
(weakly exogenous) variables are constructed using the chosen bilateral flows channel, and 
included in each country VARX*: 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  ( 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ ), 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗  , 𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗and  𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑡
∗ , while the foreign 
exchange rate variable 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  is omitted.  
The US VARX vector is again set-up to reflect its dominance on the world economy: except 
for the exchange rate, all the domestic variables are included. Meanwhile, we only include the 
following foreign variables: 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡
∗  (or 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ ), and  𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ . The price of oil global variable is 
again included as endogenous to the US VARX. As for the GCC VARX vector, we again do 
not include domestic interest rates, and specify the quantity of oil produced as an endogenous 
variable to it.  
                                                 
39 Consumption data is not available for Libya and Peru, and so they are not included in the “Consumption” 
GVAR model estimations. 
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 Dynamic Analysis 
China’s rebalancing is defined by its movement from an investment-driven economy to a 
consumption-driven one. We therefore proxy the rebalancing of China by a 1 percent reduction 
in its investment, followed by a 1 percent increase in its consumption. We measure the impact 
of those effects on China, the MENA region, and the rest of the world.  
 
 Negative Shock to China’s Investment 
Figure 4.5. Impulse responses of Investment to a 1 Percent Negative Shock to China’s 
Investment, Four Quarters Cumulated, through the Trade Channel 
 
Note: The columns represent the annual (cumulated over four quarters) impulse response results of 
country-investment following a one percent reduction of China’s investment, with the bars 
corresponding to the 90th and 10th percent confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the results to a one percent impulse response shock to China’s investment. 
Results show that, other than for Iran, the impact of a 1 percent decline in China’s investment 
leads to reduction in investment in the MENA region, on oil exporters, and systemic economies. 
Investment declines for oil exporters, like the GCC and Libya, as well as oil importers. The 
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magnitude of the shock may be borne on oil importers twice: once from the reduction of 
country-specific investment in China due to its rebalancing, and then from second-round 
effects, due to the rebalancing’s impact on the oil exporters.  
 
 Positive Shock to China’s Consumption 
Meanwhile, the second aspect of China’s rebalancing is defined by the shift to a consumption-
driven economy. We investigate the impact of this shift by computing a 1 percent positive 
impulse response shock to China’s consumption. Figure 4.6 reports the results from a one 
percent impulse response shock to China’s consumption. The results suggest positive 
spillovers to the MENA region, especially to oil importers. This could be due to the decline in 
oil prices, making imports cheaper. In addition, exporters of consumption goods would benefit 
from the increase of consumption demand from China, while countries who mainly import 
from China will additionally benefit from the depreciated Chinese Yuan. Consumption for oil 
exporters is not significantly affected, which suggests that they are more harmed by the decline 
in investment and oil prices, and must adjust accordingly. 
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Figure 4.6. Impulse responses of Consumption to a 1 Percent Positive Shock to China’s 
Consumption, Four Quarters Cumulated, through the Trade Channel 
 
 
Note: The columns represent the annual (cumulated over four quarters) impulse response results of 
country-consumption following a one percent increase in China’s consumption, with the bars 
corresponding to the 90th and 10th percent confidence bounds. The impact is in percentage. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
This research investigates the spillovers from China to the Middle East and North Africa by 
setting up two GVAR models for 47 countries (6 of which are included in the GCC bloc), using 
the bilateral trade flows channel. The first GVAR model runs from 1979Q1 to 2014Q4, and 
looks at GDP-to-GDP spillovers to the MENA region from China, the United States, and the 
Euro Area. The second GVAR model spans from 1979Q1 to 2015Q4, and uses country-
specific consumption and investment data to estimate the direct impact of China’s rebalancing 
on MENA and the rest of the world.  
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Our results draw the following conclusions from the first GVAR model: the linkages between 
China and the MENA region have deepened in the past decade, making for a propagation of 
shocks of larger magnitude from China to the MENA and GCC regions. Despite this finding, 
the results show that a negative shock to US GDP creates the largest spillover effects on the 
MENA and GCC regions. This is because, as results show, a decline in US GDP has the 
strongest impact on oil prices, compared to China and the Euro Area. In addition, while the 
propagation of shocks is stronger through the trade channel from China and the United States, 
spillovers from the Euro Area may be due to linkages of proximity and remittance flows to the 
MENA region.  
 
 Finally, turning on to spillovers from China’s rebalancing, our results show that while the 
MENA region’s investment is negatively affected from the decline in China’s investment- as 
a decline in investment demand could push down demand for oil and gas and other 
infrastructure goods, and subsequently place downward pressures on oil prices- the results are 
not statistically significant for the main exporters of oil. This is in line with our initial results, 
which show that a negative shock from China is not as large or significant as from the USA. 
We also see that the MENA oil importers incur some positive spillovers on consumption, as 
imports become cheaper and China’s import demand increases.  
  
 
 
  
112 
 
 Appendix 
 
Table A4: F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specific Foreign Variables. 
 
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 Y* Dp* Eq* Ex* R* Lr* Poil Qoil 
Algeria F(1,128) 3.92 0.50 3.35 1.77  10.79* 0.43 1.26 0.00 
Argentina F(1,116) 3.92 0.12 19.03* 0.00  32.30* 0.17 0.19 0.23 
Australia F(5,122) 2.29 1.12 2.24 0.75  0.49 2.08 0.55 1.29 
Brazil F(2,115) 3.08 1.64 0.68 0.04  1.19 0.73 0.12 1.09 
Canada F(4,123) 2.45 1.15 1.58 0.42  0.92 1.16 1.06 0.96 
Chile F(3,117) 2.68 1.01 1.60 1.25  0.25 0.97 0.85 0.84 
China F(2,127) 3.07 0.03 1.64 0.60  1.65 0.70 0.11 0.41 
Ecuador F(2,119) 3.07 0.66 0.48 0.51  2.28 1.42 1.09 0.42 
Euro F(3,116) 2.68 0.54 0.90 1.57  0.03 0.42 0.59 0.37 
GCC F(3,127) 2.68 1.05 1.49 0.77  0.70 0.40 1.44   
India F(1,127) 3.92 3.71 1.64 3.44  3.21 0.18 0.14 0.53 
Indonesia F(2,127) 3.07 4.21 0.01 0.08  0.83 0.40 0.17 0.06 
Iran F(1,129) 3.91 2.71 0.03 0.71  0.23 0.21 2.54 0.00 
Jordan F(2,127) 3.07 4.12 2.52 3.28  0.49 0.78 1.10 2.89 
Japan F(3,124) 2.68 1.63 2.34 0.17  0.96 0.21 1.03 1.16 
Korea F(4,123) 2.45 0.22 1.32 0.67  0.84 2.16 1.32 1.14 
Libya F(1,128) 3.92 2.40 0.86 1.71  0.21 0.00 1.14 1.01 
Malaysia F(1,119) 3.92 4.62* 1.11 11.15  0.09 1.65 2.71 2.42 
Mexico F(2,127) 3.07 0.02 0.34 0.54  0.42 1.10 0.49 0.27 
Morocco F(2,127) 3.07 1.62 1.84 0.21  2.44 0.94 0.57 0.16 
New Zealand F(3,124) 2.68 0.34 2.40 1.58  3.42* 0.53 0.85 0.94 
Nigeria F(2,127) 3.07 0.11 2.28 0.16  1.76 1.50 0.99 1.84 
Norway F(1,127) 3.92 0.16 0.02 0.39  0.23 0.02 0.01 0.19 
Pakistan F(2,126) 3.07 1.77 1.47 2.30  4.78* 0.56 0.45 0.34 
Peru F(3,126) 2.68 3.65* 0.90 0.49  5.30* 1.79 4.85* 0.89 
Philippines F(3,112) 2.69 0.56 0.31 1.96  4.25* 0.75 1.65 0.45 
Singapore F(1,119) 3.92 0.52 2.37 2.00  1.36 0.78 0.20 0.01 
South Africa F(4,123) 2.45 1.17 0.94 1.57  1.14 1.37 0.40 1.03 
Sweden F(3,124) 2.68 2.85* 0.74 0.93  1.12 0.21 0.60 1.74 
Switzerland F(3,124) 2.68 0.84 5.34* 0.97  1.74 1.34 0.18 0.71 
Thailand F(3,116) 2.68 0.39 0.98 1.62  0.21 0.76 0.63 1.72 
Turkey F(2,127) 3.07 0.57 0.12 0.08  0.98 0.72 3.04 1.47 
United Kingdom F(2,125) 3.07 1.78 0.36 2.37  1.53 1.42 0.84 8.25* 
United States F(3,127) 2.68 0.26 1.79  1.63    2.84* 
Venezuela F(1,128) 3.92 1.00 3.19 0.00   10.82* 0.10 0.15 0.51 
 Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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 CHAPTER 5. SPILLOVERS FROM THE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE 
ON THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION 39F40 
 
 
 
 Introduction  
In 2012, policy makers in Japan launched an ambitious policy framework (commonly referred 
to as Abenomics) based on monetary easing, flexible fiscal policy, and structural reforms to 
revive the economy and make a definitive escape from deflation. The assessment of the 
Japanese economy for the 2016 Article IV program by the IMF stressed that, while Abenomics 
met with initial success, its ambitious targets, including the two percent inflation target, will 
not be met under current policy. This was attributed to a large extent due to a lack of nominal 
wage growth, a key factor preventing the positive wage-price dynamics that Japan needs to 
revive domestic demand and reach escape velocity from deflation. Despite the fact that Japan 
has maintained relatively strong productivity growth through the last two decades, wage 
growth has lagged behind, reflecting both entrenched deflationary expectations and structural 
characteristics of the labor market.  
The case for a rise in nominal wages to break the deflationary cycle in Japan is not new. 
Everaert and Ganelli (2016) note that full time wages have increased a mere 0.3 percent since 
                                                 
40 The work presented in this chapter has been published in the Japanese Political Economy Journal in May 
2018, accepted as “Minimum Wage as a Wage Policy Tool in Japan”, by Chie Aoyagi (caoyagi@imf.org), 
Giovanni Ganelli (gganelli@imf.org). Ms. Aoyagi and the author of this thesis equally undertook the data 
collection for this research, while the author of this thesis conducted the analytical work and wrote the 
manuscript. Mr. Ganelli designed and supervised the research. All authors edited the manuscript.  
Prior to that, this research was published as an IMF working paper WP/16/232 in November 2016, entitled 
“Minimum Wage as a Policy Tool in Japan”, by Chie Aoyagi (caoyagi@imf.org), Giovanni Ganelli 
(gganelli@imf.org), and Nour Tawk. 
114 
 
1995, and call for substantial wage increases to be the “fourth arrow” of Abenomics. Aoyagi 
and Ganelli (2013) also stressed that policies aimed at raising wages would facilitate 
acceptance of reform of employment protection, which in turn would help reducing duality in 
the labor market, thus boosting productivity. But why is wage growth so weak? Aoyagi and 
Ganelli (2013) argue that there is a “coordination problem”, where companies and wage-setters 
seem to look backward in deciding on wage increases, i.e. they are reluctant to raise wages as 
they perceive deflation to be long-lasting. 
Against this background, and in a renewed effort to revive the economy, the Japanese 
government announced various initiatives aimed at promoting higher wages, including moral 
suasion under the tripartite commission and the public-private dialogue, and the announcement 
of substantial increases in the minimum wage. These initiatives were consistent with advice 
given during the 2016 Article IV consultations, which recommended that Abenomics should 
be “reloaded” through a policy upgrade package, including income policies to stimulate wage 
growth. 
This analytical exercise empirically assesses the effectiveness of one of the policy tools 
included in the income policies toolkit, under which the minimum wage is expected to be raised 
by 3 percent per year over the next few years, until it reaches 1,000 JPY per hour. Our main 
finding is that, while the increase in the minimum wage planned by the government can help 
stimulate average wage growth, the quantitative impact might fall short of the vigorous wage 
dynamics that Japan needs to escape deflation. This implies that the minimum wage increase 
should be complemented by other more “unorthodox” income policies, as we elaborate below. 
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To study the pass-through between the minimum wage and average wages, we employ a 
prefectural panel dataset of almost two decades (1997-2014) for men and women. This allows 
us to exploit the variability in Japan’s prefectural data, and has the advantage of capturing and 
contrasting gender-specific characteristics of the Japanese labor market. We make use of an 
Instrumental Variables regression to control for endogeneity in the data which may 
overestimate the pass-through effect. Our dependent variables are respectively the hourly 
average total wage, the hourly average male wage, and the hourly average female wage. We 
find that while an increase in the minimum wage will overall increase all wages, the increase 
is more pronounced on male wages. We also find that a one percent increase in the minimum 
wage could lead to about a 0.5 percent increase in total wages.  
Accordingly, based on our estimates, the plan to step up minimum wage growth from 2 to the 
planned 3 percent per year could raise wage growth by an additional 0.5 percent annually. This 
would be a significant boost to wage growth, but it would still fall short of what is needed to 
engender the kind of wage-price dynamics that Japan needs to reach escape velocity from 
deflation. Given the Bank of Japan’s inflation target of 2 percent, and assuming productivity 
growth of 1 percent, nominal wage growth of 3 percent would seem desirable for Japan. The 
policy implication of our analysis is therefore that, while the minimum wage increase policy 
announced by the authorities is helpful in stimulating wage growth, it should be complemented 
by other, more “unorthodox” income policies—e.g. a “soft target” through a “comply or 
explain mechanism” for wage growth; increases in public wages; stronger tax incentives or 
penalties as a last resort and possibly an additional wage bargaining round (see IMF 2016 for 
more details). As we discuss in more detail in the conclusions of this research, such income 
policies would need to be complemented by tax reform to make sure that higher wages do not 
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increase Japan’s already excessive labor market duality by pushing more workers into non-
regular jobs. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents stylized facts of the labor 
market in Japan. Section 5.3 discusses the relevant literature reviewed. Section 5.4 discusses 
the empirical model used for the pass-through and the data used for the analysis. Section 5.5 
presents the results. Section 5.6 concludes. 
 Stylized Facts 
In September 2015, against a background of timid inflation and disappointing growth figures 
and in a new attempt to revive the economy, the Japanese government announced his aim to 
increase Japan’s nominal GDP by 20 percent to reach 600 trillion JPY by 2020. He later 
announced his policy to raise the national weighted average minimum wage by 3 percent on a 
yearly basis, which would result in a hike from 798 JPY to over 1,000 JPY per hour by fiscal 
year 2023. This seems an ambitious target in a historical perspective, as the minimum wage 
has not grown past 3 percent since 1994 and the nominal wage has also been below 3 percent 
since 1993 (Figure 5.1.A). This weakness in real wage growth reflects in part an unwinding of 
previous real wage strength, as shown in the decline in Japan’s labor share since the 1990s. 
However, in comparison with other advanced economies, Japan’s labor share started from a 
relatively lower level in the mid-1990s and its decline over last two decades has been more 
pronounced (figure 5.1.B). The sharper declining trend in labor share in Japan is to a large 
extent driven by the comparative evolution of average wages and productivity.    
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Figure 5.1. A. Evolution of the minimum wage in Japan. B. Labor income share of the 
total economy. 
 
 
 
Japan experienced reasonably strong productivity growth in the early 90s and through the “lost 
decades”, but this growth was accompanied by a zero (and sometimes negative) real wage 
growth (figure 5.2.A). Of the other G7 countries, only Italy experienced a comparable degree 
of wage stagnation, but it was combined with weak productivity growth (figure 5.2.B). 
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Figure 5.2. A. Wages and productivity growth. B. Real wage and productivity growth in 
OECD countries (average 1992–2014). 
 
 
 
In theory, the low unemployment rate in Japan should place upward pressures on wages 
because of labor shortages. However, characteristics in the labor market negate this effect. 
Mainly, Japan’s excessive labor market duality is likely to have contributed in a significant 
way to its stagnant wage growth, as the share of non-regular workers rose gradually to reach 
almost 40 percent of total employees, and the share of part-time positions in new job openings 
reached 60 percent, putting downward pressure on average wage growth (figure 5.3). The 
presence of nonregular workers in the labor force pushes down average wages, given that their 
wages are typically lower. In addition, the low horizontal mobility in the labor market, in which 
workers opt for lower wages in return for long-term employment, creates a low incentive 
environment for raising salaries. Finally, the entrenched deflationary mentality in Japan, in 
which both firms and company workers have backward expectations, prevents a nominal wage 
growth. 
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Figure 5.3. Share of nonregular workers (annual employment change, thousand persons).
 
 
On the other hand, Japan’s minimum wage is relatively low. The minimum wage relative to 
average wages of full time workers ranks fourth lowest in the OECD (with only the U.S., 
Mexico and Czech Republic having lower minimum wages), suggesting that there is room to 
further raise it (figure 5.4.A). Japan has a minimum wage system which, although set at the 
prefectural level, can be significantly influenced by the central government. The country’s 47 
prefectures are divided into four ranks depending on their relative economic position—from A 
being highest to D being lowest— and The Central Minimum Wage Council, an advisory body 
for the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, sets guideline on prefectural minimum wage 
increases for each rank (figure 5.4.B). Based on the panel’s recommendations and taking local 
conditions into consideration, local councils decide on the actual minimum wage level for each 
prefecture.  
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Figure 5.4. A. minimum wage relative to average wages of full-time workers, compared 
with OECD countries. B. Prefectural minimum wages (selected prefectures*, JPY). 
 
Although the recommendation by the central council is not legally binding, in practice it 
provides a lower bound. Implementation of the planned increases could be further ensured by 
strengthening the central government’s role in setting the minimum wage. For the fiscal year 
2016, the government advisory panel agreed to recommend raising the country’s average 
minimum hourly wage by 24 yen, or 3 percent, which was later incorporated into the decisions 
made by prefectures, so that the actual outcome was an increase slightly higher than the one 
recommended by the central government (25 yen to 823 yen per hour on average). 
In 2014, the Japan Institute for Labor Policy (JILPT) estimated that 13.4 percent of total 
workers (4.7 percent of full-time workers and 39.2 percent of part-time workers) in Japan are 
earning a wage lower than “1.15 x prefectural minimum wage” (figure 5.5.A). Additionally, 
the Cabinet Office estimated that in 2014 the number of workers paid the minimum wage plus 
20 yen was 3.4 million (about 6.5 percent of the working population), while the number of 
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workers paid the minimum wage plus 40 yen was 5.1 million (almost 10 percent of the working 
population).  An estimate of the share of workers currently earning less than 1,000 JPY can 
also be made by looking at the distribution of wages for men and women. If we assume that 
full-time workers work 168.4 hours per month 40F41, we find that the workers who earn less than 
179,900 yen per month (179,900/168.4 hours=1,068yen) are about 10 percent of total male 
full-time workers and about 29 percent of total female full-time workers. For part-time workers, 
the share of workers below the minimum wage (calculated as below 999 yen per hour) is about 
54 percent for men and 66 percent for women (figure 5.5.B). The above estimates suggest that 
a large portion of the Japanese working population will be directly affected by the increase in 
the minimum wage.  
Figure 5.5. A. Monthly wage distribution for full-time workers (monthly wage in 
thousand JPY, percentage of total number of workers). B. Hourly wage distribution for 
part-time workers (hourly wage in JPY, percentage of total numbers of workers).  
                                                 
41 168.4 is the estimated average number of hours worked per month by full-time workers in 2014 by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare monthly survey.  
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Furthermore, the existing literature (see session 5.3 below) suggests that the effect of an 
increase in the minimum wage would go beyond the direct impact on workers whose earnings 
are around the minimum wage level, and that an increase in the minimum wage has spillover 
effects on the wage distribution. As the wages of the minimum-wage earners (who belong to a 
lower wage percentile) increase, this changes the total wage distribution, and may lead to 
changes in wages of the workers in other wage percentiles. Given this background, we believe 
that estimating the pass-through from the minimum wage to average wages is a relevant 
exercise.   
 Literature Review 
The existing literature concerning minimum wages generally focuses on the impact of the 
former either on the wage distribution (in terms of spillovers or wage inequality) or 
employment. The literature attributes the increase in overall wages due to a minimum wage 
increase to three potential effects. The first is a “truncation” effect: in a competitive market 
where workers are compensated for their marginal product of labor, an increase in the 
minimum wage will lead to loss of employment for all the workers who are paid less than the 
minimum wage, thus causing a truncation of the wage distribution below the new minimum 
wage.  The second effect is referred to as a “spike” effect, by which if firms choose to retain 
the workers whose wages are below the minimum wage, their wages will be increased 
according to the minimum wage hike, causing the wage distribution density to spike around 
the minimum wage. The last effect is a spillover one: given that the minimum wage will raise 
the cost of minimum-wage earners, firms may choose to substitute them for more skilled 
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workers. The increase in the demand for higher-skilled labor will subsequently raise their 
wages (Autor, Manning and Smith, 2010).  
Wage distribution studies look at the “ripple “effects of a change in the minimum wage on 
earners at different levels of the wage distribution: if minimum wage earners are at the 10th 
percentile wage earning percentile, studies show that workers in other percentiles (typically 
the 5th or 20th percentile) may be affected, depending on which factors come into play. Some 
of the most influential studies on the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution 
are the papers by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), Lee (1999), and Autor, Manning and 
Smith (2010). DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) rely on the U.S. Current population 
survey’s (CPS) data for a semi-parametric analysis of how the minimum wage changes affect 
the wage distribution and inequality. They find that, in the U.S., the decline of the real value 
of the minimum wage caused a substantial increase in wage inequality for women. Lee (1999) 
uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on cross-state variation data to explore the effect of the 
fall of the federal minimum wage on inequality and earnings in the U.S. He finds that more 
than the total increase of wage differentials at the lower tail of the income distribution (50/10 
ratio) was due to the decrease in the minimum wage. 
Autor, Manning and Smith (2010) also investigate the impact of the minimum wage on 
earnings inequality in the U.S. They argue that Lee (1999)’s results are over-estimated due to 
bias in the data and propose to use Instrumental Variables (IV) instead of OLS to correct the 
sources of bias. They find that increasing the minimum wage reduces inequality in the lower 
tail of the wage distribution (by increasing the wages of the lower tail earners), but that usually 
the impact is very small for males. They also find that for the U.S., the effect of the minimum 
124 
 
wage extends to the wage percentiles where the minimum wage is not binding, implying 
spillovers to other percentiles. 
Studies concerning the impact of the minimum wage on the Japanese labor market are scarce. 
A notable study is the paper by Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2013) who use 
women’s wage percentile data to assess the impact of a minimum wage increase in a 
deflationary period (between 1994 and 2003). They find that the minimum wage increase 
resulted in the reduction of inequality for women by the subsequent increase of their wages, 
and caused negligible employment losses.   
Some studies also investigate the effects of a minimum wage increase on employment, given 
that a substitution effect may come into play as the minimum wage rises, where employers 
may choose to hire (now seemingly less costly) higher skilled workers instead of minimum 
wage earners. Neumark, Schweitzer and  Wascher (2004) use the CPS hourly and weekly wage 
data on rotation groups of people that show variations in the wage data. They argue that an 
increase of the minimum wage has negative employment effects on minimum wage earners, 
and has little positive effect on higher-wage earners. Gramlich (1976) suggests that a 
substitution effect may come into play as minimum-wage workers’ wage increase, thus 
increasing the employment of higher-wage earners. Schmitt (2013) and Betcherman (2012) 
review recent research which suggest that there are little to no employment effects following 
a minimum wage increase.   
Other researchers look into the impact of a minimum wage increase on part-time and full-time 
employment. Cunningham (1981) and Katz and Krueger (1992) find evidence suggesting that 
the minimum-wage hike may discourage part-time work and boost full-time employment, 
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while Gramlich (1976) and Hungerford (2000) report that in some cases part-time work seems 
to increase, reducing full-time employment. These authors also find that high wage workers 
could be affected directly or indirectly by supply or demand shifts. Average wages might 
increase if the demand for higher-wage earners increases, as firms opt for employing full time 
(or more experienced) workers given that minimum wage earners have become more 
expensive. On the other hand, the labor supply of high-wage workers might increase as low-
wage workers become unemployed or face less hours of work because of the minimum wage 
increases, leading to a decline in wages for high-skilled workers. 41F42  
Our main contribution to the literature is the following. We look at the pass-through of the real 
minimum wage on total wages, men’s wages, and women’s wages in Japan using an updated 
panel dataset from 1997 to 2014. We find that a 1 percent increase in the minimum wage would 
increase average wages by 0.42 percent for women and by 0.66 percent for men, while total 
(for both men and women) average wages would increase by 0.48 percent.  
 Empirical Strategy: Estimation of the Pass-Through of Minimum 
Wages to Average Wages in Japan  
 Data  
The dataset employed in this research includes prefectural level data from Japan’s Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare statistics, and covers seventeen years, from 1997 to 2014.   
                                                 
42 Neumark, Schweitzerand Wascher also suggest that results concerning the impact of the minimum wage vary 
regarding the period lag: research indicates that a significant portion of the minimum wage effect on 
employment occurs after a one-year lag. They also note that while immediate effects are usually positive, 
adverse effects can be seen in one year.  
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We run three separate regressions, in which the dependent variables are respectively average 
wage for men, women, and the total weighted average of men and women’s wages. 42F43 For each 
regression, a vector Z of variables is included.  In addition to the minimum wage (adjusted for 
inflation), we use the following variables: the unemployment rate, the consumer price index 
(CPI), prefectural real GDP, the share of part-time work applicants (which is our proxy of 
duality in the labor market), 43F44 the share of employment in manufacturing, and the average age 
of workers.44F45  
Data on the wage percentiles on a prefectural level is not publicly available, which explains 
our choice of dependent variables. Wages for males, females and in total are monthly wages, 
reported on a yearly basis. They do not include bonuses, and they cover full-time workers only. 
In order to transform real wages from a monthly to an hourly measure, we divide them by the 
number of hours worked each month including overtime. Finally, we also adjust them for 
inflation. The minimum wage variable is the prefectural-level minimum wage, on an hourly 
rate. The minimum wage variable is also adjusted using the CPI index. Finally, while real GDP 
is the GDP of each prefecture, due to data availability the CPI index is the index for each major 
city in each prefecture, rather than the prefecture itself.  
                                                 
43 For any given year t, the weighted average total wage is computed by summing together men’s wages 
multiplied by the number of male workers and female wages multiplied by the number of female workers, and 
then dividing the sum by the total number of workers that year. 
44 We use the share of part-time new job applications to total new job applications as our proxy of duality 
because the share of part time workers to total workers is not available at the prefectural level. 
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 Empirical Estimation 
Autor, Manning and Smith (2010) argue against using OLS. They identify two sources of bias 
in their data: first, they point out that fluctuations between the state wage median and other 
wage percentiles may be correlated. Secondly, they note that there may be a correlation 
between the trends in wages and the minimum wage, as they would fluctuate together and 
follow trends in the economy. They note (as well as Lee (1999)) that using fixed effects may 
worsen the bias: if there is an upward trend in wages, using fixed effects may strengthen this 
trend, and vice-versa if a downward trend exists. Despite the fact that we use real average 
wages instead of wage percentiles, we believe that endogeneity between minimum wages and 
average wages could very possibly exist, as minimum wages and average wages fluctuate 
together depending on trends in the economy. In addition to that, a key factor for policy-makers 
in setting the prefectural minimum wage is average wages in each prefecture, which may be 
another source of endogeneity in the data.   
We regress log of hourly average real wage in each prefecture on the prefectural hourly real 
minimum wage and the control variables. We present our results using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and then Instrumental Variables, and find that OLS present a much higher coefficient 
for the pass-through between the minimum wage and average wages. Using a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (augmented regression test), we confirm the existence of endogeneity between 
minimum wages and average wages. Therefore, we employ a two-stage least squares 
regression using the number of male and female applicants to social welfare as instruments.  
We therefore follow the same strategy used by Autor, Manning and Smith (2010) and make 
use of an instrumental variables regression. When using instrumental variables in a regression, 
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the instrument must satisfy the condition that it would lead to a change in the minimum wage 
variable without affecting the dependent variable (real wages), aside from indirectly via the 
minimum wage.  
In Japan, minimum wages are established at a prefectural level, and take into consideration 
three factors: a) workers’ cost of living, b) workers’ wages, and c) the capacity of normal 
industries to pay wages (Japan’s Labor Administration and Legislation).  The first factor is 
measured by the access and demand for public assistance. In other words, in prefectures where 
the minimum standards of living are not met, there must be a higher amount of public 
assistance. As a response to that, minimum wages are adjusted accordingly, to help meet the 
standards of living of such prefecture. In that context, public welfare would have a direct 
impact on minimum wages but not on average earnings, which therefore makes a proxy for it 
a valid instrument for an instrumental variables regression. 45F46 
 Given that there is no publicly available data for the amount of public welfare offered by each 
prefecture, we choose to use as instruments the number of male and female applicants to social 
welfare in each prefecture, divided by the total amount of social welfare applicants in Japan, 
to approximate which prefectures have the highest demand for public welfare. 46F47  
We now set up the model that examines the pass-through between average wages and the 
minimum wage. Let 𝑤𝑖𝑡 denote the average wage in prefecture i in year t, 𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡 the minimum 
                                                 
46 The results of the standard tests for weak instruments (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002) as well as the over-
identifications test (the Sargan, Basmann and Wooldridge tests) are shown in the appendix. 
47Our data shows that the prefecture with the highest number of applicants for public welfare to population is 
Tokyo. 
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wage, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡  the vector of control variables that expectedly affect wages. We therefore 
describe the relationship between the minimum-wage and total wages as follows:  
 ln 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 ln𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
As mentioned above, the controls vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡  includes the CPI index, GDP, the average age of 
workers, the unemployment rate, the duality proxy and the share of employment in 
manufacturing, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  represents the error term. Having established the presence of 
endogeneity in the data, we use 2SLS to determine the pass-through between real wages and 
the minimum wage.  
 Results 
The results of our Instrumental Variables estimation are reported in Table 5.1, and are 
supportive of the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum wage would help increase 
average wages in Japan. The regression suggests that a 1 percent increase in the hourly 
minimum wage could increase the hourly average wage by about 0.48 percent. Our results 
show that wages for men would increase by 0.66 percent as well, while women’s wages would 
increase by 0.42 percent. This increase is statistically significant for both men and women. 
Table 5.2 reports the results from an OLS estimation, with the coefficients predictably 
overestimated.  
Our results are also indicative of labor trends for the Japanese work-force, as our estimation 
reveals that women’s average age is negatively correlated to their wages, while for men, their 
age has a positive impact on their wages. This reflects the traditional seniority wage system 
that in Japan, where workers’ wages grow in accordance to the length of their period of work 
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in a company instead of their productivity. In contrast, we see that women are left out from the 
seniority based pay increase, mainly because many women drop out of the work force after 
bearing children and later restart working only as supplemental income earners in the 
household. Some of the factors behind this phenomenon include the tax deduction for spouses, 
which places an income cap on the second earner in a Japanese household (typically the 
woman).  Other discouraging factors could be the lack of support with regards to childcare 
facilities to women when they are working.  
The spousal tax deduction could also explain how minimum wage and duality measurement 
have different effects on male and female average wages. Female workers who choose to work 
full-time would not receive the spousal tax deduction, which is why most women choose to 
work part-time in Japan. While the spousal tax deduction system is not by itself gender 
discriminatory, in practice it is mostly women who adjust working hours to be eligible for the 
deduction. This reduces the supply of women for full-time labor, which explains why the labor 
duality is higher for female workers. In that context, men and women seem to transact in 
separate labor markets and thus average wages for men and women respond differently to some 
factors. With the minimum wage increasing, women may choose to lower their working hours 
in order not to pass the spousal tax deduction threshold, thus causing a smaller change in the 
monthly wage distribution. This can explain why the pass-through of the minimum wage to 
men is higher than that to women, despite the fact that women make the majority of minimum 
wage workers.  
In addition, the duality proxy, which is a measure of relative supply of part-time workers to 
full-time workers, is positive and significant for women. Intuitively, as this indicator increases, 
the full-time labor supply becomes relatively scarce, and thus pushes up the average wage of 
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full-time workers in the female labor market. This explains why the duality proxy is positive 
for women, while the coefficient is negatively correlated to men’s wages and wages in total 
(although these effects are not statistically significant).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Wage Determinants in Japan (Prefectural Panel), Regression Results Using 
Instrumental Variables (hourly), in logs 
Period: 1997-2014 Dep. Variable: 
Real wages (total) 
Dep. Variable: 
Real wages (Women) 
Dep. Variable: 
Real wages (Men) 
 Minimum Wage 0.48** 
(1.92) 
0.42** 
(2.28) 
0.66** 
(2.42) 
CPI Inflation -0.008** 
(-2.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
0.01** 
(02.31) 
Prefectural GDP 0.0003 *** 
(4.33) 
0.0004*** 
(6.20) 
0.0004*** 
(5.09) 
Share of part-time 
workers 
-0.09 
(-0.99) 
0.12** 
(1.65) 
-0.1 
(-0.85) 
Unemployment Rate -0.009* 
(-1.75) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
0.01* 
(1.69) 
Share of employment in 
manufacturing 
0.002*** 
(3.52) 
0.001* 
(1.78) 
0.003*** 
(3.21) 
Average female age -0.03*** 
(-6.22) 
-0.02*** 
(-5.00) 
--- 
 
Average male age 0.04*** 
(5.28) 
--- 0.03*** 
(4.27) 
Constant -2.41 
(-1.30) 
-1.93 
(-1.36) 
-6.23** 
(-3.14) 
R-Squared 0.63 0.70 0.53 
Source:  IMF Staff Calculations 
Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, 
and *** significance at 1 percent level 
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Table 5.2. Wage Determinants in Japan (Prefectural Panel), Regression Results 
Using Ordinary Least Squares (hourly), in logs 
Period: 1997-2014 Dep. Variable: 
Real wages (total) 
Dep. Variable: 
Real wages (Women) 
Dep. Variable: 
Real wages (Men) 
 Log Minimum Wage 1.05 *** 
(9.63) 
1.22*** 
(15.37) 
1.06*** 
(8.05) 
CPI Inflation -0.002 
(-0.87) 
0.007*** 
(3.96) 
0.01*** 
(4.27) 
Prefectural GDP 0.0002 *** 
(3.73) 
0.0001*** 
(4.23) 
0.0002*** 
(6.24) 
Share of Part-time Job 
Applications 
 
-0.21*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.09** 
(-1.77) 
-0.20** 
(-2.09) 
Unemployment Rate -0.008** 
(-1.71) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
0.007 
(1.44) 
Share of Employment 
in Manufacturing 
0.001** 
(2.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
0.002** 
(2.73) 
    
Average female age -0.02*** 
(-5.80) 
-0.01* 
(-4.10) 
--- 
Average male age 0.03*** 
(4.78) 
--- 
 
0.03*** 
(5.64) 
Constant -6.61*** 
(-7.61) 
-8.03*** 
(-12.52) 
-9.12*** 
(-8.87) 
R-Squared 0.65 0.75 0.53 
Source:  IMF Staff Calculations 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, 
and *** significance at 1 percent level 
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 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we evaluate the potential impact of Japan’s planned minimum wage increase 
on average wages. Our econometric results indicate that the pass-through of a one percent 
increase in the minimum wage would translate into about a 0.5 percent increase on wage in 
total. Gender specific regressions suggest an increase of 0.42 percent in the average wages of 
women, versus a 0.66 percent increase in the average wages of men.  
The planned minimum wage increase in Japan has already been put in motion. In July 2016, a 
government advisory panel agreed to a 3 percent increase for the next year, a step up from the 
2 percent it advised in previous years. Accordingly, our estimations suggest that this policy 
would expected to result in an additional 0.5 percent increase in average wages. This increase 
in average wages resulting from the minimum wage policy would be a significant boost to 
wage growth, but it would still fall short of what is needed to engender the kind of wage-price 
dynamics that Japan needs to reach escape velocity form deflation. Given the Bank of Japan’s 
inflation target of 2 percent, and assuming productivity growth of 1 percent, wage growth of 3 
percent would seem desirable for Japan. The policy implication of our analysis is therefore 
that, while the minimum wage increase policy announced by the authorities is helpful in 
stimulating an increase in wages , it should be complemented by other income policies—e.g. 
a “soft target” for wage growth and increases in public wages. Furthermore, implementation 
of the planned increases could be further ensured by strengthening the central government’s 
role in setting the minimum wage. 
Another important issue to consider when evaluating the impact of the minimum wage policy, 
and of income policies more in general, is related to complementarity with other reforms, such 
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as tax policy. In Japan, part-timers account for the majority of non-regular workers, and they 
are mostly women. One of the factors behind the high female share of part-time workers is the 
tax deduction for spouses, which is a tax advantage that goes to married couples when one of 
them (usually the wife) earns less than 1.03 million yen. Also, from October 2016, previously 
exempt workers will be required to pay into the national health insurance and pension programs 
if they meet certain conditions, such as working at least 20 hours a week at a company with 
501 or more employees and earning at least 1.06 million yen a year. The tax and social security 
system is therefore encouraging many married women to limit paid work, and the government 
is currently examining how to eliminate this tax advantage to mobilize more female labor force 
in regular jobs.  
Despite efforts in this direction, such as subsidies to employers which split social insurance 
contributions with employees (conditional on increasing work hours and wages for their part-
time employees) anecdotal evidence suggests that many part-time workers chose to reduce 
working hours to avoid hitting the new threshold. There is therefore a risk that, even if income 
policies are successful, in the absences of tax and social security reform, the attendant increase 
in wages might end up encouraging non-regular work. This underscores the importance of 
eliminating tax and social security distortions at the same time as income policies are 
implemented.  
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 Appendix 
Tests for Instruments Validity and Significance 
 
1. Average Total Wages Regression:  
Table A5.1. First-Stage Regression Results 
Variable R-squared Adjusted R-sq Partial R-Sq F (2,365) Prob > F 
Real Minimum 
Wage (in log) 
0.7478 0.7409 0.2027 30.9384 0.0000 
 
Critical Values Number of Endogenous regressors: 1 
Ho: Instruments are weak Number of Excluded instruments: 3 
2SLS relative bias 5% 10% 20% 30% 
13.91 9.08 9.54 5.39 
2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test 10% 15% 20% 25% 
22.30 12.83 9.54 7.80 
 
The F-statistic is 30.94, which exceeds Stock, Wright and Yogo’s (2002) recommended F-
statistic value for inference (F=10) for a 2SLS estimator to be reliable. 
Furthermore, our test statistic exceeds the critical values for the “2SLS relative bias test” at 
5%, 10%, 20% and 30% (30.94 > 13.9), as well as the “2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test” 
at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% levels (30.93>22.30). We can therefore conclude that our 
instruments satisfy Stock and Yogo (2005)’s two conditions for an instrument to not be weak.   
Table A5.2. Test of Over-Identifying restrictions 
Test of Over-Identifying Restrictions  Value Significance (p-value) 
Sargan (score) chi2(1)  = 7.3 p= 0.0069 
Basmann chi2(1)  = 7.24 p= 0.0071 
Wooldridge (score) chi2(2) =8.25 p = 0.0161 
 
Based on the Wooldridge score test, we do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments 
are valid at the 1% significance level, though we reject the null hypothesis that our instruments 
are valid at the 5% significance level. 
2. Average Male Wages Regression:  
Table A5.3. First-Stage Regression Results 
Variable R-squared Adjusted R-sq Partial R-Sq F (2,365) Prob > F 
Real Minimum 
Wage (in log) 
0.7445 0.7382 0.2375 37.9969 0.0000 
 
Critical Values Number of Endogenous regressors: 1 
Ho: Instruments are weak Number of Excluded instruments: 3 
2SLS relative bias 5% 10% 20% 30% 
13.91 9.08 6.46 5.39 
2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test 10% 15% 20% 25% 
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22.30 12.83 9.54 7.80 
 
The F-statistic is equal to 37.99, and thus passes Stock Wright and Yogo’s (2002) 
recommended F-statistic value for inference (F=10) for a 2SLS estimator to be reliable, as well 
as the tests for 2SLS relative bias, and the 2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test  
Table A5.4. Test of Over-Identifying Restrictions 
Test of Over-Identifying Restrictions  Value Significance (p-value) 
Sargan (score) chi2(2)  = 4.36 p= 0.1131 
Basmann chi2(1)  = 4.293 p= 00.1169 
Wooldridge (score) chi2(2) =5.00398 p = 0.0819 
 
Based on the Sargan and Basmann score tests, we do not reject the null hypothesis that our 
instruments are valid at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, though with the Wooldridge 
test score we reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid at the 10% significance 
level. 
3. Average Female Wages Regression:  
Table A5.5. First-Stage Regression Results 
Variable R-squared Adjusted R-sq Partial R-Sq F (2,366) Prob > F 
Real Minimum 
Wage (in log) 
0.7477 0.7415 0.2320 36.8583 0.0000 
 
Critical Values Number of Endogenous regressors: 1 
Ho: Instruments are weak Number of Excluded instruments: 3 
2SLS relative bias 5% 10% 20% 30% 
13.91 9.08 6.46 5.39 
2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test 10% 15% 20% 25% 
22.30 12.83 9.54 7.80 
 
The F-statistic is equal to 36.85, and thus passes Stock Wright and Yogo’s (2002) 
recommended F-statistic value for inference (F=10) for a 2SLS estimator to be reliable, as well 
as the tests for 2SLS relative bias, and the 2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test  
Table A5.6. Test of Over-Identifying Restrictions 
Test of Over-Identifying Restrictions  Value Significance (p-value) 
Sargan (score) chi2(2)  = 0.85916 p= 0.6508 
Basmann chi2(1)  = 0.83225 p= 0.6576 
Wooldridge (score) chi2(2) =0.897377 p = 0.6385 
 
Based on the Sargan, Basmann, and Wooldridge score tests, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that our instruments are valid at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
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Conclusion  
 
The main results of this thesis have already been presented in detail in the introduction and 
their respective chapters, and therefore will only be restated briefly here. Rather, in this 
conclusion, we will focus on the main contribution of each analytical exercise to the existing 
literature, and the policy recommendations which can be derived from the results obtained.  
Finally, we will explain the limitations of each analysis, and discuss possible avenues for future 
research.   
 
In Chapter Two, we employ a Global VAR (GVAR) model to study the possible spillover 
effects from the Bank of Japan’s Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) program on 
emerging Asia. This research contributes to the literature by being the first to look at the impact 
of QQE on other countries in emerging Asia, through the fluctuations in equity prices, aka the 
stock market channel. More importantly, the main contribution of this chapter is in its 
identification of unconventional monetary shocks. Specifically, we apply sign restrictions to 
an equity price shock to disentangle it from a standard financial shock, so that we can identify 
the impact of QQE on stock prices. Additionally, we test the propagation of shocks using the 
shadow short-term rate as an unconventional monetary policy tool. Our results highlight the 
importance of looking at the effects of unconventional monetary policy through unorthodox 
proxies, when interest rates are at (or below) zero. Specifically, by highlighting the 
transmission of shocks not only through the interest rate channel but also the stock price 
channel, we observe that spillovers were not indiscernible in Southeast Asia. Rather, despite 
currency appreciation in Southeast Asia, spillovers were positive in the short-term, due to 
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increased investor confidence in the region, illustrated by a temporary increase in equity prices, 
and capital inflows.  
Having observed that countries with deeper financial linkages to Japan experienced temporary 
spillover shocks, we focus our policy recommendations to that group.  First, we suggest that 
countries counter the losses from currency appreciation by taking advantage of the lower 
import costs from Japan, especially for intermediate production goods. A flexible exchange 
rate can help better absorb temporary trade shocks, as well as any appreciation caused by the 
increase in capital inflows. In addition, a financial deepening for such countries can reduce the 
impact of global risk factors, and mitigate the risks brought forward by a higher foreign 
participation. Meanwhile, central banks can make use of that increase in investment by creating 
incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI) and by placing caps that limit temporary 
portfolio flows, so to stabilize the exchange rate. inflows. Finally, we recommend continued 
clear forward guidance from the Bank of Japan, so that central banks in emerging Asia can 
prepare for exchange rate shocks by increasing their respective reserves.   
In the future, we wish to extend this research by overcoming some of the challenges which 
arose from this analytical exercise. Specifically, we would like to investigate in more depth 
how to apply sign restrictions to identify an unconventional monetary policy shock from a 
financial shock. This is because the literature for this exercise remains limited, whereas there 
is abundant evidence in the literature of applying sign restrictions to identify a monetary shock 
from a financial shock. In addition, we hope in the future to explore different transmission 
channels to a monetary or financial shock. For instance, we hope to obtain at some point large 
and high frequency data for bilateral portfolio flows, so that we can include this channel of 
transmission in the GVAR. Finally, we aim to obtain more high-frequency data for other 
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countries in emerging Asia, especially other ASEAN countries, so to include them in this 
analysis. 
  
Chapter Three looks at the spillovers of the rebalancing of China on the rest of the world. 
Specifically, it builds a GVAR model using country-specific consumption and investment data, 
then calculates the net effects on the rest of the world of a negative shock to China’s investment 
followed by a positive shock to China’s consumption. By doing so, this chapter can look at the 
effects of China’s switch from an investment-driven economy to a consumption driven one on 
investment and consumption patterns in other countries. To that aspect, the main contribution 
of the research is by its identification of the rebalancing shocks, as opposed to the current 
literature, which studies the rebalancing by focusing on GDP-to-GDP spillovers from China to 
the rest of the world. Using a proxy which looks at both the effects of the decline in investment 
demand in China and the increase in the consumption demand offers a novel way to view how 
the impact of the rebalancing might be borne on other countries. To this extent, our research is 
the first to investigate potential spillovers from the change in GDP components for China and 
other countries. Through this exercise, we could note that spillovers are not necessarily only 
negative. In fact, through the increase in consumption demand for China, many countries seem 
to mitigate the adverse effects of the decline in investment, by benefiting from the increased 
export demand for consumption goods and the decline in export prices. However, the proxy 
analysis shows that the impact of this switch in China’s growth model is twice borne on 
commodity exporters, where the decline in investment is as adverse on commodity prices as 
the increase in consumption.  
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Considering these results, we focus our policy suggestions on this group of countries, and 
recommend the diversification of their exports base, so that the losses from the decline in 
commodity prices are mitigated.  Additionally, increasingly strong fiscal and monetary 
fundamentals can help a country substantially weather financial shocks and capital outflows, 
especially in the cases of a global “risk-off” sentiment, which generally highly impacts 
emerging markets. Finally, a flexible exchange rate regime is recommended for the commodity 
exporting countries with pegged exchange rates, as it absorbs terms of trade shocks, does not 
deplete the central bank’s reserves, and causes a milder contraction in output. However, we 
suggest that this switch takes place when the economy is relatively stable, and the central bank 
has accumulated enough reserves to stabilize the depreciation of the currency. 
In this chapter, the main challenge in the research came from the time frame of the dataset 
itself, which ends in 2015. We hope to extend our dataset in the future up to 2017, and explore 
ways to disentangle the rebalancing shocks of China from any other shocks that may be picked 
up by the dataset. 
In Chapter Four, we compare the magnitude of shocks from systemic economies, namely the 
United States, the Euro Area, and China, on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
In addition, by using time-varying weights in the GVAR model, we look at the evolution of 
trade linkages in the last two decades between the region and these three systemic economies. 
Our research contributes to the literature by adding to the small body of research which studies 
the impact of systemic shocks on the MENA region. It builds a large extended dataset of 47 
countries, which extends to 2014Q4. Finally, it applies the rebalancing proxy of China, 
innovated in Chapter Three, to the MENA region, and is the first research to do so, to the best 
of our knowledge. Chapter Four offers similar insights as chapter Three but for the MENA 
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region. However, through the comparison of shocks between the MENA and the other 
economies, we mainly highlight that the region is much more vulnerable to shocks from the 
United States than from China and the Euro area, specifically through the oil price channel.  
To that extent, we also suggest that a transition to a flexible exchange rate system would be 
helpful in alleviating the adverse effects of present or future shocks from these systemic 
economies, especially for the commodity exporters who do not have enough reserves to 
withstand the near-term exchange rate fluctuations. Again, we recommend shifting towards a 
more diverse exports base, to lessen the impact of future commodity price shocks. As for the 
commodity importers in the MENA, they can take advantage of the lower oil prices and 
cheaper imports to boost their local production, so that they can decrease their reliance on the 
GCC and Euro Area. 
The limitations of the research were mainly related to data availability. Despite the systemic 
importance of the MENA region, and the efforts towards collecting its macro related data, a 
sizable portion of data for various countries is not easily attainable. But it is our hope, once 
more data is obtained, to build an extended GVAR model which covers more countries from 
the MENA region, to capture the effects of systemic shocks on the region. Additionally, 
concerning the GVAR literature, we would like to expand the model to more countries which 
are currently not included in most datasets, such as Russia and countries in the Caucus and 
Central Asia. Finally, we hope to explore, if data permits, the impact of systemic shocks on the 
remittance flows for the MENA, given the importance of this transmission channel to 
commodity importers in the region. 
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Finally, in Chapter Five, we estimate the pass-through of the minimum wage to average wages 
of full-time workers in Japan. This exercise employs a dataset which extends until 2014, for 
both male and female workers, for the 47 prefectures of Japan. This study is the first, to the 
best of our knowledge, to look at the spillovers from an increase in the minimum wage on the 
wage distribution for both men and women in Japan, thus offering a comparative analysis of 
how and why the pass-through differs for each gender. By carrying out this research, we also 
contribute by extending the small body of literature concerning the impact of the minimum 
wage on wages in Japan. The main findings are that, while the spillover effect on the wage 
distribution is positive, it may not be large enough to engender the wage-price dynamics 
needed for Japan to escape deflation. We also observe that while women are the majority of 
part-time workers in Japan, they may not fully benefit from the increase in the minimum wage, 
due to tax laws that may indirectly discourage their participation in the labor market. In 
accordance to the obtained results, we stress the importance of eliminating tax distortions so 
that the increase in wages is more efficient and more pronounced. We also encourage 
complementarity of the labor reforms with other reforms, such as in tax policy, to mobilize 
more female workers into the labor force. 
Future extensions of this work concern using wage percentile data for Japan, as we believe that 
the contribution of such research would be of more importance for policymaking. For instance, 
most minimum wage literature uses the wage percentile data (which is not publicly available 
on a prefectural level for Japan) to assess the impact of the minimum wage on the wage 
distribution. With this data, one can look at the spillover effects from a minimum wage increase 
on the certain percentiles of the wage distribution, specifically those immediately above or 
below the minimum wage-earning percentile. The results from such an analysis would yield 
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more insight on the impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality and unemployment.  We 
hope to obtain this data in the near future, to shed more light on the dynamics of the Japanese 
labor market.   
 
In conclusion, the chapters in this dissertation contribute to the literature on the study of the 
propagation of shocks and spillovers from policies, by highlighting the various channels 
through which policies can have an impact, on a domestic and international level. We hope 
that our work, by offering new proxies for the identification of shocks, as well as by extending 
the data coverage of the GVAR to less-studied regions, can contribute to the study of spillovers 
for researchers and policy-makers. 
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Data Appendix  
 
Variable Description Source Notes 
Real GDP (y)  
𝑦 = ln
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
IMF IFS, 
IMF WEO 
The monthly time series 
are obtained using the 
Chow-Lin interpolation 
method, with the 
Industrial production 
index as a reference.  ( 
seasonally adjusted 
using Eviews X13) 
CPI inflation (dp)  𝑑𝑝 = ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) IMF IFS, 
IMF WEO 
 
 
Equity prices (eq) 
𝑒𝑞 = ln
𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Bloomberg The MSCI index for 
each country is used. 
Exchange rate (ex) 
𝑒𝑥 = ln
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
Bloomberg 
and the BIS 
for Japan 
The bilateral exchange 
rate is used for chapter 
2.  
The nominal effective 
exchange rate is used 
for chapters 3 and 4 
Monetary base (mb) Monetary base, percent. IMF IFS   
Short-term interest rate 
(r) 
r= 0.25*ln(1+ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠 /100) IMF IFS - For China, the deposit 
rate is used. 
- For Malaysia, the 
Philippines, the treasury 
bill rate is used.  
- For Japan, Indonesia, 
Thailand, the money 
markets rate is used. 
Shadow short-term 
rate 
r= 0.25*ln(1+ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑠 /100) Federal 
Bank of 
New 
Zealand/ 
Leo 
Krippner 
Research 
The shadow rate is used 
for Japan, for Chapter 2.  
Bank credit (bc) 
𝑏𝑐 = ln
𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
IMF IFS  Claims on the private 
sector (seasonally 
adjusted using Eviews 
X13) 
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Price of Oil  US dollars per barrel, in natural 
logarithm 
IMF IFS  
Price of Metal Index price for metals IMF IFS   
Imports and Exports In millions of U.S. Dollars IMF CDIS Direction of Trade 
statistics 
Portfolio flows In millions of U.S. Dollars IMF CPIS Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey 
FDI flows 
 
 
 
 
Capital inflows 
 
In millions of U.S. Dollars 
 
 
 
 
In millions of U.S. Dollars 
 
𝑐𝑓 = ln
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
 
IMF  
 
 
 
 
Haver 
Analytics 
(EPFR 
Asia) 
Coordinated Direct 
Investment Survey 
 
 
 
 
Private Investment  Haver 
Analytics 
Gross capital formation 
is used for the 
investment series.  
Consumption  Haver 
Analytics 
The sum of public and 
private consumption is 
used for the 
consumption series. 
Average Wages, Japan   MHLW Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare 
(MHLW) statistics 
Average Age of 
Workers, Japan 
 MHLW  
Share of Part-Time 
Work Applicants, 
Japan 
 MHLW  
Unemployment Rate, 
Japan 
 LFS Labor Force Survey 
(LFS)/ Statistics 
Bureau 
Prefectural GDP, 
Japan 
 MHLW  
Prefectural CPI, Japan  LFS  
Share of Employment 
in Manufacturing, 
Japan  
 LFS  
 
 
 
